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THESIS ABSTRACT 
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Master of Arts 
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Title: From Guantanamo Bay to Pelican Bay: Hunger Striking and the Biopolitical 
Geographies of Resistance 
 
 
In this work I illustrate the ways in which power structures function in 
operationalizing geographies of resistance in two particular carceral spaces. Specifically I 
examine the social organization and internal power relations present within hunger 
striking prison populations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and at Pelican Bay State Prison in 
Crescent City, California. I show that the Guantanamo hunger strikes are minimally 
organized with non-binding power structures, while the Pelican Bay hunger strikes have 
had greater levels of commitment, and have been more sophisticated in organization. I 
consider the relationships that exist between power, identity and violence within these 
hunger strike resistance movements. I contextualize these phenomena within a 
biopolitical framework that advances more traditional definitions of biopolitics; as 
opposed to conceptualizing biopolitics as a technology of power manifested by the state, I 
argue that oppressed populations, such as prisoners, construct their own power by 
regulating their own ‘vital biological processes.’  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Introduction to the Project, Context & Research Questions 
 
This thesis is a critical evaluation of agency, performance and resistant 
geographies of power. In this research I evaluate the internal power relations and social 
organization of hunger strike resistance in two carceral spaces: the political prison at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and Pelican Bay State Prison in Crescent City, California, 
including the wider California prison system writ large. I present data on the social 
organization of hunger strikes in these prison settings to better understand why such 
social phenomena occur in the ways that they do. I analyze these phenomena through a 
lens of resistant geographies and biopolitics. In doing this I re-conceptualize biopolitics 
as a technique of power manifested by subaltern populations, rather than simply a 
technique of power manifested by the state; this enables me to analyze and better 
contextualize my topic. Not only are these frameworks of resistant geographies and 
biopolitics useful in establishing theoretical ideas that are applicable to prison studies, 
these are also theoretical constructs that have utility in analyzing power and the 
geographies of resistance beyond prison environments.  
Hunger striking has historically been a method of protest within carceral spaces. 
When the subject is raised, many recollect the widely publicized hunger strikes in the 
early 1980s in Northern Ireland (O’Hearn 2009). Also notable are the hunger strikes and 
death fasts that occurred in Turkey between 2001 and 2007 (Bargu 2014). I examine 
hunger strikes at Pelican Bay and GTMO here because the socio-spatial dynamics of 
hunger striking resistance exhibit certain similarities and differences in regard to the 
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strikes’ internal power relations and social organization in both respective carceral 
spaces. I establish the empirical context of this below.  
In the summer of 2011 a Hunger Strike within the Solitary Housing Units 
(hereinafter SHU) at Pelican Bay State Prison in Crescent City, California was initiated 
by a handful of prisoners that then grew in number over weeks and months. While the 
SHU prisoners subsequently terminated their strike, another strike was conducted for 
several weeks later that fall. After planning and coordination from within the SHU as 
well as from support groups on the outside, Pelican Bay SHU prisoners organized and 
conducted another hunger strike starting in July of 2013. This strike, which lasted for two 
months, saw tens of thousands of prisoners in solitary confinement across California 
participating in the strike in solidarity, with thousands of prisoners in the General 
Population at Pelican Bay and in the California prison system conducting a work 
stoppage alongside the hunger strikes. 
Furthermore, since January 11th, 2002, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba has been the site 
of a political prison that has detained alleged members of Al Qaeda captured in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan after 9/11. Over the last fourteen years the prison has seen 
many episodes of hunger striking. Earlier strikes beginning with the prison’s inception in 
2002 were overall less frequent in comparison to strikes that have occurred since 2005. 
Notable strikes include a protest in the summer of 2005, which requested extension of 
Geneva Convention protections to prisoners and the establishment of a Prisoners’ 
Council of detainee leaders. A later strike with participation numbers similar to the 2005 
strike occurred in 2013, lasting at least until November.  
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These two particular situations are the focus of the research for this thesis on the 
biopolitical geographies of hunger striking resistance. My main research questions are the 
following: 1) how do prisoner populations at Pelican Bay and at GTMO respectively 
demonstrate power structures, socially organize, coordinate and make decisions in the 
operationalization of their hunger strikes? 2), why does each respective prison population 
perform their unique social organization of hunger striking, i.e., why do they strike with 
the organization and power relations with which they strike? And 3), how do these social 
formations of resistance speak to relationships between power, identity and violence in 
these carceral spaces? While I examine these questions within the context of these two 
socio-spatial circumstances, these examples serve as a means for understanding why 
certain groups and individuals seek to subject their bodies to greater or lesser scales of 
violence, what I refer to as the ‘biopolitical geographies of resistance’, which I elaborate 
upon in greater detail in chapter 2.  
Before proceeding any further, it is necessary for me to establish the 
epistemological basis for several of the terms I utilize in my research questions. I define a 
resistant geography as an act of protest that is performed in space, the performance of 
which is defined by how, why, and where the performance occurs. Furthermore, my 
conception of ‘social organization’ refers to the power structures, coordination, decision-
making, and collective and/or individual operationalization of hunger striking. Social 
organization is a term that discusses the socio-spatial dimensions of how prisoners 
negotiate together or individually the decision to hunger strike or not to hunger strike, i.e. 
the question of social organization considers the power relations present in the 
operationalization of these geographies of resistance.  
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As one can see, my first research question seeks to present the empirical, more 
objective data on the aspects of each strikes’ socio-organizational dynamics. My second 
question is more subjective: why do we see the particular styles of social organization in 
hunger striking resistance in these prison spaces? Ultimately my third question speaks to 
the greater analytical, critical component of the thesis, and is closely associated with 
question 2. My research demonstrates that the Pelican Bay hunger strikes’ social 
organization is defined by an overall unified, collective mentality, in which there are 
strong affiliations between prisoners on a group scale due to organizational centralization. 
In contrast, the GTMO hunger strikes involve the performance of more individuated, 
personalized geographies of resistance where a unified and centralized commitment to 
resistance is less important in comparison to Pelican Bay. 
This study concludes that hunger strikers at Pelican Bay are brought together by a 
consciousness of the fact that all incarcerated racial groups constitute an imprisoned class 
within themselves; this consequently has resulted in significant dissolution of gang 
animosities and has produced interest in group agency and resistance. Alternately, the 
GTMO strikes are defined by more ad-hoc, spontaneous episodes of protest that are less 
reflective of group interests and are more driven by individual grievances, and are the 
result of prisoners who are not bound by group decisions to resist collectively. I 
contextualize these empirical findings through my theoretical framework of the 
biopolitical geographies of resistance; it is through understanding how oppressed bodies 
seeks to regulate and manage themselves that we will see to what extent and why certain 
oppressed bodies subject themselves to greater violence through their own agency at 
subaltern scales of power.  
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Case Studies & Methodology 
Hunger striking has long been a common tactic of resistance across carceral 
space. Given ample time and data one might be able to produce a deeper and more 
holistic genealogy of the varieties of social organization behind hunger striking in 
prisons, to better compare and contrast the power structures and social organization 
present in such resistant geographies. This is beyond the scope of a Master’s thesis. This 
research takes advantage of two particular spaces of confinement with distinctly different 
qualities in regard to how prisoners operate and organize their strikes. It is by this choice 
of case studies and my subsequent methodologies that I discuss the genres of power 
relations in hunger striking prisoner populations present in these prison spaces. The two 
empirical situations are discussed independently in their own respective chapters. The 
case studies presented in this thesis, that of Pelican Bay State Prison/the California prison 
system writ large and GTMO Bay, Cuba, were chosen specifically to focus on differing 
social, political and cultural geographies of resistance within carceral space. 
From information that can be gathered from the media that is available to the 
general public, I have been able to conclude that the social organization of hunger 
striking in prison environments is often unique to that specific prison, in that decisions 
and actions of resistance occur for different reasons with differing techniques, sets of 
power relations and scales of participation by prisoners. The 2011 and 2013 California 
hunger strikes at Pelican Bay State Prison were widely publicized through the efforts of 
families, activist groups and local media. This effort led to a movement that then spread 
to other California prisons and included tens of thousands of prisoners hunger striking for 
particular lengths of time. These strikes were conducted on a significant scale of 
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involvement in regard to thousands of prisoners transgressing racial and cultural 
boundaries, and thus it is for this reason that I have chosen to examine the Pelican 
Bay/California strikes.  
The prison at GTMO has a much smaller population. In 2013 the Department of 
Defense (hereinafter DOD) released the numbers of strikers who were protesting starting 
in February of that year. While the DOD stopped releasing these numbers in December 
2013, major fluctuations in hunger strike involvement by prisoners were reported. 
Additionally, conflicting reports have labeled specific prisoners as leaders of past strikes 
with certain authority over decision-making and resistance across the prison population. 
These conflicting reports and varying levels of resistance have allowed me to ascertain 
the scalar extent to which prisoners have become associated, or not, with hunger striking 
at GTMO, and whether there is more or less of an individual versus group mentality in 
the performance of resistance.  
Methodologies often must be unique to the particular case study, prison or 
phenomenon being researched. This research engages in a very micro scale, localized 
form of analysis in the examination of the internal power relations and social 
organization of hunger strikes, and as such, I have taken advantage of methodologies that 
reveal the social phenomena in question at these localized scales of power. Multiple 
challenges are often faced in conducting prison research, particularly in regard to data 
access (Wacquant 2002). Representing marginalized voices can be limited not purely by 
prison administrations themselves, but also by universities. My methods have had to cater 
to what the University of Oregon’s institutional review board (hereinafter IRB) is willing 
to permit. After several updated protocols and full reviews on my proposed data 
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collection, the IRB continued to stand its ground in opposition to a portion of my 
proposed methods of data collection on the Pelican Bay/California hunger strikes. 
Alternately, my methods for research on GTMO were approved in an expedited review, 
outside of the full review process, albeit after a lengthy process. Despite these challenges 
I have sought to represent prisoners’ marginalized voices with the methods that I have 
chosen. Prisoners are uniquely positioned to comment on the social realities they endure 
(Piche et al 2014; Wacquant 2002), and as such I use methods that privilege voices 
directly, but that are also available to me pragmatically. I explain my methods by case 
study below.  
I employed a two-fold methodology for collecting data on the Pelican Bay strikes. 
Firstly, I conducted semi-structured interviews with a physician who has been involved 
with prison activism in California for many years, in addition to being involved in the 
hunger strikes on the outside in 2011 and in 2013. The physician interviewed was able to 
provide data on the medical context of hunger striking in regard to the role that health 
played as a factor that contributed to and/or limited scales of striking. Secondly, I 
conducted an archival review of letters sent by prisoners to the non-profit organization 
California Prison Focus during the Strikes. I visited California Prison Focus (hereinafter 
CPF) at its office in Oakland, California in order to collect this data. These letters were 
sent during the 2011 and 2013 strikes, some of which identify strike representatives, the 
extent of involvement by different gangs in the strike, resistance objectives, and 
descriptions of rationales for the initiation and termination of resistance.  
The methodology for data on the GTMO hunger strikes was derived significantly 
from semi-structured interviews with three GTMO defense attorneys who have 
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represented prisoners that have been released from the prison. I also interviewed a 
psychiatrist hired by the defense attorneys to consult with prisoners at GTMO regarding 
hunger strikes and medical issues in the prison. These attorneys and the psychiatrist have 
spent many hours consulting with their clients and have visited GTMO on multiple 
occasions. As such the psychiatrist has been able to provide clearer insight as to how 
prisoners negotiate their resistance, or lack of resistance, with themselves and/or other 
prisoners. The data from the psychiatrist interview enables me to understand the linkages 
between the prisoners’ health and how it affects strike organization and commitment. It 
was necessary to interview these several professionals as I needed to establish a 
representative sample of the social organization of how the GTMO strikes were 
conducted. While I could not speak directly to GTMO prisoners, either currently or 
formerly incarcerated, I recruited this population of professionals that have spent a 
considerable amount of time at GTMO working with GTMO prisoners.  
Interviewing the attorneys became a challenge because of the representative 
sample I was attempting to establish; this was because the attorneys are focused on their 
cases and their cases only, and can only speak about one or a few prisoners, and were 
reluctant to make broader, more sweeping statements regarding the social organization of 
the hunger strikes. I initially discovered a variety of phenomena that was somewhat 
contested by some of the interviewees, and it was only after speaking to several 
interviewees that I was able to establish a clearer consensus regarding the internal 
structures and power relations at work in the hunger strikes. While the majority of my 
data on the GTMO strikes is derived from these interviews, I also draw upon some 
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document-based data in the form of legal reports and prisoner medical records available 
publically. 
Chapter Overview 
Following this Introduction, chapter 2 provides a review of the academic literature 
on the topic of resistant geographies. I then lay my theoretical foundation for how I 
contextualize these resistant geographies, and explain how a reconceptualization of 
biopolitics from a subaltern perspective enables me to discuss the relationships between 
power, identity and violence in these hunger strike case studies. In chapter 3 I present 
data on the social organization of hunger striking at GTMO Bay. Chapter 4 follows with 
the presentation of data on the internal characteristics of hunger strike organization at 
Pelican Bay/California. These two empirical chapters on hunger strike organization at 
GTMO and California put me in a position to answer my first research question: how 
hunger strikes in both prison environments are socially operationalized, and secondly, 
why the illustrated social formations and technologies of organization have occurred 
within both spaces of incarceration.  
In my conclusion, chapter 5, I compare and contrast the empirical similarities and 
differences between hunger strike resistance at GTMO and in California. I address the 
theoretical question of how these genres of resistance are best explained through a 
biopolitical contextualization. In this synthesis I argue that we must conceive of a 
biopolitics of scale when analyzing geographies of resistance, where the management of 
bodies occurs from below within a given population, i.e., biopolitics must be conceived 
through a more bottom-up approach. I epistemologically situate biopolitics as a technique 
of power that is devised and manifested by the subaltern, rather than just a technology of 
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power that the state utilizes for its own interests. This permits me to answer my ultimate 
research question regarding the relationships between power, identity and violence in 
both prison spaces, and explains why certain bodies choose to endure more violence than 
others through the performance of hunger striking.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW & THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS 
 In this chapter I review the academic literature on geographies of resistance. The 
second half of the chapter is then devoted to my theoretical contribution where I 
reconceptualize Foucauldian biopolitics as a geographical theory of resistance. In my 
concluding chapter I return to this biopolitical geography of resistance in order to more 
completely answer my third research question, analyzing the conceptual relationships 
among and between violence, power and identity in the GTMO and California hunger 
strikes.  
The Geographies of Resistance 
 In their edited volume Geographies of Resistance, Pile and Keith (1997) provide 
one of the few compilations of literature on the geographies of resistance within political 
and cultural geography. Their ontological conception of power is rooted in the idea that 
the elite hold power, while resistance is conceived of as the idea of protest or fighting 
back against the elite. For Pile and Keith, resistance is about making other spaces, i.e., 
other geographies, possible. When studying resistance, attention must be paid to the 
“ways in which resistance uses extant geographies and makes new geographies and to the 
geographies that make resistance” (Pile and Keith 1997, 2). Additionally, “…resistance 
becomes a mode through which the symptoms of different power relations are diagnosed 
and ways are sought to get around them, or live through them, or change them” (Pile and 
Keith 1997, 3). Thus resistant geographies are interested in altering social relations and 
changing social space. Common elements within resistant geographies include “desire 
and anger, capacity and ability, happiness and fear, dreaming and forgetting” (Pile and 
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Keith 1997, 3). Resistance, therefore, may be constituted by a multitude of emotional, 
social, political and cultural geographies.  
 Studies on resistance in the past have focused on themes of temporality, class 
struggle, and economic contradictions (Pile and Keith 1997). Several empirical studies in 
geography have engaged with these themes: Michael Watts has emphasized the 
relationships between state violence, resources and cultural/ethnic identity in Nigeria; 
Routledge has discussed how space and power have been contested in political revolution 
in Nepal; Brown discusses how power is negotiated between the state and civil society in 
urban space surrounding activist movements in Vancouver, British Columbia; Jacobs 
analyzes uneven power structures in resistance struggles faced by Aboriginal groups in 
Australia (Pile and Keith 1997). Routledge (1997) further argues that while these studies 
are empirically informative, they end up over-generalizing phenomena by virtue of their 
place-based nature. Routledge argues that literature on geographies of resistance should 
emphasize the more localized social, cultural and political heterogeneities of resistance 
across spaces. Routledge suggests that it is more useful to speak about resistance in terms 
of ‘resistances’, or ‘webs of resistance’. For Routledge, resistance is “any action, imbued 
with intent that attempts to challenge, change, or retain particular circumstances relating 
to societal relations, processes and/or institutions. These circumstances may involve 
domination, exploitation, subjection at the material, symbolic or psychological level” 
(Routledge 1997, 69). Actions of resistance may involve symbolic performance, social 
networks, physical settings, bodily processes, cultural/religious practice, desires and 
hopes.  
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 Routledge emphasizes that social movements often repress their own internal 
heterogeneities in the interests of a broader tactic. Thus resistance may operate on an 
individual scale as well as on a broader scale, where the greater interests of the group 
supersede those of single individuals. In order to conduct resistance on these various 
scales, social spaces and networks must be established. Such spaces through which these 
scales of resistance are operated may be real, imaginary or symbolic. Acts of resistance 
that embody these symbolic, imaginary, emotional themes consequently transform space 
into ‘performed space’ (Routledge 1997).  
 In order to appreciate the complexities within such social processes and 
performed spaces of resistance, we must understand how such sites are “created, claimed, 
defended and used” (Routledge 1997, 71). Firstly, spatial process and relations across 
scales influence the character and emergence of resistance. Secondly, Routledge suggests 
that we must ask how practices illustrate the homogeneity or hetereogeneity of resistance 
in space. Thirdly, it is necessary to consider how these relationships enable or constrain 
articulations of resistance, and lastly, we must consider how the character and meaning of 
place may change upon a social space becoming a site of resistance. Overall, Routledge 
argues, the goal in studying geographies of resistance is to present radical interpretations 
of the relationships between political identities, political spaces and radical politics 
(Routledge 1997). In order to fully understand the complexities of resistant geographies, 
we must challenge any assumption that asserts that political struggles can be understood 
purely in terms of the practices of institutions and the power elite (Pile and Keith 1997).  
Pile and Keith are somewhat contradictory in saying this based upon their 
approach in referring to resistance as resistance and power as power, which they 
  
14 
 
epistemologically define as separate entities. I do believe that scales of resistance are 
entirely significant; however, my epistemological approach here suggests that it is more 
suitable to interpret resistance as power on any scale. On this point Michel de Certeau, a 
philosopher interested in practices that challenge dominant orders, suggests that spaces of 
resistance can and ought to be acknowledged as being dislocated from those of the 
powerful:  
…resistance does not just act on topographies imposed through the spatial 
technologies of domination, it moves across them under the noses of the 
enemy, seeking to create new meanings out of imposed meanings, to re-
work and divert space to other ends (de Certeau 1984, 18).  
 
Thus the performance of group and individual identities becomes an effort to re-invent 
the meaning of space. Resistance becomes a technique of the self, in which individuals 
and groups exhibit performed power. Fanon discusses this social process, arguing that it 
is necessary for resisters to conquer parts of themselves in order to resist power (Pile and 
Keith 1997). Thus the process of becoming is key to resistance, and resisters must 
develop an identity of resistance.  
Scale & Resistant Geographies 
It is often a challenge to be able to discern where power is located in a struggle, as 
individuals and groups are positioned differently in multiple and unequal power 
relationships. Because of these challenges in understanding positionality relative to 
power, this thesis utilizes the concept of scale in its epistemological approach in order to 
understand the social organization of resistance. And while there is a relation between 
localized scales of resistance and the state, the theoretical emphasis and bridge I seek to 
provide here rests upon how power is constructed on a micro scale, i.e. resistance and 
agency in prison resistance movements. In order to establish a theoretical synthesis 
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between the geographies of resistance and scale, I review the use of scale in geographic 
literature below.  
The concept of scale in geography has historically been a common unit of 
analysis. Smith (1992) presents a Marxist perspective on scale, explaining how capital 
moves across scales in the global economy. Smith also uses the term ‘politics of scale’, 
emphasizing how power is implicit in scalar relations. In Smith’s words, it “is 
geographical scale that defines the boundaries and bounds the identities around which 
control is exerted and contested” (1992, 66). Smith also writes of ‘jumping scale’, where 
“political claims and power established at one geographical scale are expanded to 
another” (2000, 726). Brenner further defines scale as “a ‘vertical’ differentiation in 
which social relations are embedded within a hierarchical scaffolding of nested territorial 
units stretching from the global, the supranational, and the national downwards to the 
regional, the metropolitan, the urban, the local, and the body” (2005, 9). Brenner’s 
vertical perspective on these spatialized levels of analysis is mostly rooted in how capital 
is fixed within such scales. Cox (1998) discusses how the local operates beyond 
jurisdictional boundaries, and views the politics of scale through networks of 
associations. Cox considers how ‘spaces of dependence’, or fixed arenas of social life, 
develop interplay with ‘spaces of engagement’, or networks that go beyond fixed space in 
networks of interaction (1998). Marston (2000) argues that scale should be examined 
from a social-constructionist perspective, in order to situate capitalist production, the role 
of the state, labor and non-state political actors. Marston argues that this framwork holds 
possibilities for social change. Similarly, Jones (1998) suggests that scale must be 
understood as an epistemology - not ontologically as something that exists but rather as a 
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way of apprehending. Furthermore, Towers (2000) argues that scale can be used to 
analyze social structures and human agency. Alternately, Marston et al (2005) negate the 
concept of scale in its entirety, arguing that scale has developed excessive conceptual 
differentiation amongst geographers, and preconfigures social life with its constructions 
and hierarchies.  
I do not agree with Marston et al (2005) that scale is too variegated conceptually 
to be useful in spatial thinking. On the contrary, it has significant utility, and because of 
its multiplicity of purposes across and within geographic subfields it must be 
contextualized with specificity. The emphasis in the geography literature on scale has 
been empirically situated within the realms of economic geography, Marxist geography 
and political economy, as shown above. Political and cultural geography have not taken 
advantage of scale to this same extent. Thus I propose this synthesis where definitions of 
scale from the literature are adopted from the literature to be configured within a more 
political-cultural framework, in particular within the geographies of resistance.  
Very few studies in geography have engaged with the idea of scalar power 
relative to resistance. This is a literature gap that I seek to fill by analyzing the internal 
power relations and social organization of hunger striking at GTMO and Pelican Bay. 
Definitions of resistance are bound up in the ways in which people have the capacity to 
change their social realities, or at least seek to change them. Taking the vertical 
perspective from Brenner, scales of resistance are produced in part by authority, with the 
state on one end of the scalar hierarchy; individuals and groups, such as prisoners, on an 
oppressed scale, resist with the agency they manifest for themselves on a lower scale, 
especially at the scale of the body. Additionally, geographies of resistance subsequently 
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become imbued with power upon materially, pragmatically and socially formulating their 
unique technologies of protest. Within the prison landscape, power and violence at the 
scale of the state is exerted over prisoners, with the agency of protest, such as hunger 
striking, occurring at more micro, localized scales within prison populations. At the scale 
of oppressed prison populations, geographies of resistance are constructed, wherein micro 
scales of power relations and social organization exist within the operationalization of 
resistance. Thus an epistemology of localized scales of internal resistance in carceral 
space enables us to examine the power structures and social coordination within such 
geographies of resistance, e.g. hunger striking.  
I proceed below by outlining literature on hunger striking within the social 
sciences in order to draw linkages between the scalar perspective on geographies of 
resistance and the particular technology of resistance examined in this thesis. I then 
explore what I refer to as the transgressive biopolitical geographies of resistance in 
demonstrating how power can be contextualized within these localized scales and 
apparatuses of protest.  
Hunger Striking Literature 
Although literature on hunger striking has existed across the social sciences, 
geography has been a field where it has only been discussed marginally. Sharpe (1973) in 
his extensive account of protest movements defines hunger striking as a nonviolent 
expression of resistance, meaning that hunger strike participants globally and historically 
have discursively represented their protests as active resistance that is peaceful in hopes 
of producing social and political change. Research on hunger striking has focused 
primarily on Ireland (Beresford 1987; Campbell et al 1994; O’Malley 1990; O’Rawe 
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2005). Givant (1982) discusses the traditional perspective in hunger striking of 
martyrdom and nobility in self-destruction. Feldman (1991) explains that hunger strikes 
are authenticated by the “symbolism of the corpse”, and similarly Sweeney relates hunger 
striking to a “cult of self-sacrifice”. Other scholars have examined gender (Aretxaga 
1987), as well as hunger strikers’ context within the media (Mulcahy 1995). White 
(1988) has examined the relationships between hunger strikes and social movement 
commitment and the linkages between movement ideology, protest culture and solidarity.  
Scanlan et al (2008) acknowledge that while the social science literature on 
resistance and protest in general has been extensive, these accounts have only marginally 
mentioned hunger strikes, meaning that hunger striking has not been a unit of analysis 
that has been directly studied. Scanlan et al provide a detailed history of hunger strikes 
throughout the 20th century. In their words: “Although not ‘new’, hunger strikes have had 
increasingly new applications, be it in emergent or existing movement within new 
cultures, or in new settings and contexts” (2008, 286).  Scanlan et al emphasize that 
hunger strikes have had increasingly new applications across emergent or existing 
movements within new cultures, new settings and contexts. Using a comparative and 
historical perspective these authors analyze how, why and when hunger strikes occur, and 
who has utilized them to seek change. Scanlan et al find that hunger strikes over the last 
century have been widespread phenomena and are typically small, brief and relatively 
successful tactics for protesting against state power. Hunger strikes, they argue, exhibit 
the interplay between structural factors influencing the emergence of such resistance, and 
exemplify hunger striking as a form of self-sacrifice that carries symbolic meaning.  
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Scanlan et al argue that what is unique about hunger strike protest is the potential 
self-destruction of the body. In studying hunger strikes, Scanlan et al argue that emotion, 
declaration, duration and representation are themes that must be discussed in evaluating 
hunger strikes. They suggest that hunger strikes ought to be considered from a 
comparative perspective, as examining hunger strikes across movements and actors can 
reveal the unique cultural, social and political power dynamics implicit in how hunger 
strikes function. Furthermore, Scanlan et al also emphasize the geographic context of 
hunger striking, stating that while authorities can engineer mechanisms of control in 
space, insurgents change meaning and uses of space, at times transforming their material 
poverty into advantage (2008). Thus hunger strikes are socio-spatial in nature, and it is 
through this socio-spatial perspective that my conceptual framework and empirical 
examples are examined.  
Bargu (2014) provides a deep ethnographic analysis of hunger striking and death-
fasting prisoners in Turkey. Political prisoners in Turkey began hunger strikes that 
became death fasts starting in 2000, and ended in January 2007. Turkish political 
prisoners had protested the infrastructural development of what were termed F-type 
prisons for solitary confinement. While many of these protesters were released, many 
continued their hunger strikes and death fasts privately. Bargu explores the death-fast 
struggle by placing self-destructive techniques of political action at the center of her 
inquiry in order to theorize this highly particular form of struggle in which life is forged 
into a weapon. Bargu explores the justifications and reasons for choosing such tactics as 
well as the ethical and political implications of these death-fast struggles.  
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Within the context of the Turkish hunger strikes and death fasts, Bargu 
theoretically contextualizes such tactics and violence as the “weaponization of life”. In 
her words, “The self destructive act makes a commentary on the meaning of life by 
conveying the prioritization of the life of a political cause over the biological existence of 
its proponents” (2014, 16). In evaluating the ethical dimensions of bodily destruction, 
Bargu draws on Foucault to understand the biopolitical context of starvation and death. 
Bargu goes beyond Foucault, however, in stating that biopolitics is better referred to as 
“biosovereignty” in this case. In other words, Bargu suggests that these techniques of 
resistance become a social and political process where individuals and groups exercise 
their own oppressed sovereignty outside of state sovereignty.  
In this thesis I focus on two spaces of confinement in which localized power in 
hunger striking differs. I evaluate these two socio-spatial circumstances individually, 
which are then later compared in my analysis, such as Scanlan et al suggest. My approach 
here is similar to and different from Bargu’s; Bargu touches on scale, but does not sketch 
it out overtly. I empirically analyze the micro scale power relations and social 
configurations in hunger strike organization at GTMO and at Pelican Bay. In addition, 
like Bargu, this is a method for understanding why certain incarcerated bodies subject 
themselves to violence at greater scales than others in carceral spaces. I answer this 
question within my framework of the biopolitical geographies of resistance, outlined 
below.  
The Biopolitical Geographies of Resistance 
The theoretical framework that I will use to contextualize the phenomena 
examined in this thesis is an extension of biopolitics (or biopower) as originally presented 
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by Michel Foucault. In this section below I provide a more nuanced conception of 
biopolitical theory in which I bring resistant geographies together with biopolitics. It is 
necessary to spatialize biopolitics in order to develop more useful intellectual tools for 
understanding the geographical contexts of resistance and the violent implications 
thereof. 
Lemke (2011) emphasizes the broad use and variety of definitions attached to the 
concept of biopolitics. In Lemke’s words: 
…(biopolitics is) part of a shifting and conflicting theoretical and 
political field. Each answer to the question of what processes and 
structures, what rationalities and technologies, what epochs and historical 
eras could be called ‘biopolitical’ is always and inevitably the result of a 
selective perspective. In this respect, biopolitics must sharpen its 
analytical and critical profile against the blind spots and weak points of 
competing suggestions (2011, 2).   
 
Thus biopolitics is a subjective term, and cannot simply be implied; it must be qualified 
within the context in which it is used. While my theoretical framework is grounded in 
Foucauldian biopolitical principles, I expand Foucault’s biopolitics, arguing that 
biopower must be conceived of as having a more spatial and scalar dimension.  
Michel Foucault’s work is largely historical, or, as he would prefer, genealogical, 
in that he often traces thematic developments throughout the history of continental and 
western society. Foucault is concerned with power, and begins his analysis of the 
genealogy of power in western society in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 
(1995). In this seminal work Foucault examines how legal authority and the image of 
incarceration established their power by virtue of their spectacle; torture and the realities 
of imprisonment were a facet of early modernity, Foucault argues, and encouraged 
subjects to obey authority’s expectations. Furthermore, it is in Discipline and Punish 
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where Foucault introduces and elaborates upon Bentham’s panopticon. Foucault 
identifies western society as adopting Bentham’s original architectural design in 
articulating the norms of societal behavior directed by the possibility of surveillance. To 
be institutionally monitored without knowing whether or not one is being watched was a 
fundamental aspect of how power structures functioned between the 17th and 18th 
centuries. This in turn produced what Foucault terms discipline, which he also refers to as 
‘anatomo-politics’, i.e. a technique of individuated power where ‘docile bodies’ are 
manufactured as compliant in order to function within a presupposed hierarchical place in 
society. The production of docile bodies is ultimately the production of identity, as one is 
expected to assume one’s given hierarchical place unquestioningly, and acknowledge 
oneself by virtue of that place.  
In Discipline and Punish Foucault argues that western society’s panopticism 
prevailed as the dominant mechanism of power in producing social behavior during the 
post-Renaissance period (1995). In his later lectures from the late 1970s, however, 
Foucault begins identifying a technique of power that transgressed anatomo-politics – 
that of biopower or biopolitics. Foucault first introduces this social and political 
transgression in his 1976-1977 lectures Society Must Be Defended (2003). For Foucault, 
biopolitics was a technique of power in which a given power structure, i.e. the state, 
sought to manage or regulate a given population for the interests of the power structure. 
While anatamo-politics was focused upon individuated power, panopticism and docile 
bodies, Foucault explains that power shifted from being focused on producing the 
individual to being more focused on populations as a whole. It was in the 19th century, 
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Foucault argues, that western society became socially aware of itself as a species with the 
advent of this new technique of power.  
Foucault explains that collective bodies are essential for enabling power to do 
what power wants to do, and so, genealogically speaking, power began to intervene in 
certain regulative capacities to further its interests, as opposed to purely punishing 
individual bodies. Foucault emphasizes that while there was this transgression of power 
in the western world at this time, anatomo-politics did not ‘disappear’ per se as a 
technology of power. Discipline, Foucault says, remained as a component of the wider 
biopolitical apparatus. In Foucault’s words, “This new technique does not simply do 
away with the disciplinary technique, because it exists at a different level, on a different 
scale, and because it has a different bearing area, and makes use of very different 
instruments” (2003, 242). Thus genealogically these two series of power “are not 
mutually exclusive and can be articulated with each other” (Foucault 2003, 250). In other 
words, disciplinary and regulatory mechanisms of power function together in a system of 
normalization, where there is some form of individuated production of subjects along 
with an emphasis on biological regulation. This tandem construct, however, is a 
transgression beyond pure discipline, where the endgame of biopower is the biological 
management of the population.  
In greater detail, biopolitics is characterized by the advent of the state’s control 
over a population’s “vital biological processes” (Foucault 2003). These include the 
management of reproduction, mortality, health, and other regulative techniques at the 
institutional level as mechanisms that invest in the biological well being of a population. 
As an example, the era of industrial capitalism was highly biopolitical in its operation; as 
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Foucault emphasizes, bodies are necessary on a collective industrial scale as sources of 
labor in factories, and so the state and the bourgeoisie had to ensure that bodies would be 
present and able to permit capital accumulation for the bourgeoisie. This involved 
providing a certain quantity and quality of health care and housing to laborers, because 
production had begun to suffer by virtue of the extreme exploitation workers had begun 
to endure by this point. This capitalistic biopolitics also involved slightly raising wages 
so that workers would be able to live to work another day. Thus workers were managed 
in such a capacity that they were able to exist and be socially reproduced for power’s 
interests. In The History of Sexuality Vol. 1, Foucault argues that discourses of sexuality 
became more common in the west in the 18th and 19th centuries as a biopolitical technique 
of power. Sexual discourse, Foucault argues, became more institutionalized in hospitals 
and schools in encouraging the permissiveness of pleasure to further manufacture 
biological and therefore social reproduction for the interests of capital and the state 
(Foucault 1977; 1978). As Foucault says, bodies must be physically present in order for 
the state apparatus to manifest its power through the regulation of populations of bodies, 
and thus provisioning sexual discourse throughout the population within institutional 
spaces was a manifestation of biopower. 
Foucault also argues that population management can be exercised not just in 
economic forms but also through discourses of racism, security and militaristic practices. 
In Society Must Be Defended and later in Security, Territory and Population and The 
History of Sexuality Vol. 1, Foucault explains how most war and/or violent conflicts have 
been fought against the name of one population, while at the same time in the name of 
another population. The European Fascism of the 1930s and 1940s and the rise of the 
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Nazi party is Foucault’s chief example of this, where Jewish bodies had to be completely 
annihilated in order to insure the racial purity of Aryan bodies (Foucault 2003). 
Twentieth-century wars utilized drafts to recruit bodies to fight other bodies for the 
purpose of representing the power of one race as superior to another, a technology of 
power where discourse and biopolitics functioned jointly.  
What stands out regarding all of Foucault’s discussions of biopolitics as well as 
geographical contributions to the subject is the scalar differentiation between anatomo-
politics and biopolitics. Let us recall that anatamo-politics differs from biopolitics in that 
anatamo-politics is individuating and interested in creating docile bodies; it is a technique 
of power that is out to target every specific body on an extremely personalized scale. And 
while these mechanisms often flow together, biopolitics is more interested in bodies 
collectively and the regulation of a population in general. Furthermore, the common unit 
of analysis that seems to run throughout Foucault’s and geographers’ discussions of 
biopower, as well as anatomo-politics for that matter, is the role of the state as the arbiter 
of power. It is the state that constructs panopticism; it is the state that institutionalizes 
regulatory mechanisms over the birth and death rate, discourses of sexuality, education, 
health care, labor, and all the rest of it. While any scholar of Foucault will readily 
acknowledge that Foucault believes that power is everywhere, it ultimately seems that 
Foucault believes it is always derived from the state. This is the point from which I build 
further. Biopolitics is clearly germane to how the state functions and why it uses its 
power in the ways that it does; however, biopolitics is not just a technology of power that 
is ascertained and utilized by state power structures. Biopolitics is an apparatus that is 
exercised and manifested by the subaltern. Borrowing from Gramsci, I use subaltern in 
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this context to refer to populations that are subjugated, oppressed, and manipulated, i.e. 
those individuals and groups that are the victims of the elite.  
Geographers have employed Foucauldian biopolitics in across political, cultural 
and economic geography. Biopolitics is a term that is used across academic disciplines 
with different meanings and interpretations. Geographers in particular have sought to 
spatialize biopolitics across subfields. Coleman and Grove (2009) discuss the extent to 
which Hardt and Negri’s analysis of biopolitics has a spatial dimension. The authors 
emphasize that there is a biopolitical geography in dividing up and conquering the 
generative energies of a global pool of laborers, and that we further ought to pay attention 
to the space-time embeddedness of particular forms of labor and exploitation in order to 
see the biopolitical realities present. Legg (2005) argues that biopolitics can be 
analytically and methodologically applied within the sub-discipline of population 
geography, and as such population geography must have awareness of the biopolitical 
processes and their different and multiple scales of operation. Salter (2006) examines the 
micropolitics of borders by outlining the relation between the government and the 
individual body. Salter suggests that a biopolitical order is constructed along with the 
formalities of passports, visas and biometrics how populations and individuals cross 
between sovereign spaces. Similarly, Sparke (2006) discusses the expedited border-
crossing program Nexus and its production of the geographies of citizenship in North 
America. Sparke argues that inter-state mobility for an entrepreneurial business class is 
an outcome of an exclusionary and exceptional biopolitical technique of power, 
functioning together with neoliberal trade policies. Alatout (2006) investigates 
Palestinian and Israeli environmental narratives as effects of power, arguing that while 
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Palestinian narratives focus on property rights and are more territorially-driven, Israeli 
narratives are more biopolitical in that they promote and focus on quality of life, health 
and the general well-being of the population. Additionally, Nally (2011) examine how the 
management of food folds into biopolitical strategies for managing life, in that corporate 
agribusiness attempts to recondition spaces of human and animal life in order to quicken 
the reproduction of capital.  
While geographers have interlaced biopolitics within variety of spatial 
frameworks, I seek to go further by spatializing Foucault’s original definition of 
biopolitics within the realm of the geographies of resistance, a conceptual transgression 
that geographers have not yet made. Bargu (2014) explains that resistance relative to 
Foucauldian social thought has been significantly undertheorized. Foucault touches on 
resistance briefly in the History of Sexuality Vol. I, saying that “Where there is power, 
there is resistance” and that “Power comes from below, that is, there is no binary and all 
encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations, and 
serving as a general matrix” (1978, 94, 95). While Foucault makes these brief points, he 
does not outline in any depth frameworks of resistance to state biopolitics. This is what  
attempt to sketch out here.  
If we say that management of bodies in a population exists only at the state scale 
then we are precluding any kind of massifying mechanisms of embodied regulation that 
may exist on other social scales, particularly within scales of resistance. I am proposing a 
more nuanced biopolitics of the self, a biopolitics where bodies seek to manage 
themselves through their own available agency, where the subaltern regulate their own 
vital biological processes as a technique of power. To speak of biopolitics as purely state-
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driven precludes us from understanding how resistance has biopolitical elements in 
subaltern contexts. This conception of biopolitics is one where populations construct and 
manifest their own power through regulatory mechanisms that they attempt to institute 
through their own agency.  
In writing on GTMO, Derek Gregory (2006) discusses biopolitics, exception, and 
what Agamben refers to as the ‘homo sacer’ or bare life: “…while I think it is wrong to 
represent the space of exception as the paradigmatic space of political modernity, I do 
believe it is a potential space whose artificial brutalities must be – and are being – 
resisted at every turn” (2006, 421). What is interesting here is that Gregory frames 
biopolitics within the realm of resistance. He further says:  
And the prisoners themselves have refused to be reduced to bare life: 
insisting on their individual dignity, standing their ground before hostile 
military tribunals, and undertaking directly biopolitical modes of 
resistance, including hunger strikes and suicide attempts that culminated in 
the deaths of (those) three young men in June 2006 (2006, 421).   
 
Suggesting that biopolitical power exists in forms of embodied resistance is an entirely 
unprecedented statement, and is a strong conceptual differentiation from what scholars 
have long understood biopolitics to be (i.e. a technique of power utilized by the state for 
managing populations). How is resistance biopolitical, and why should we conceive of it 
this way? What does this mean? Gregory does not provide explanation here; his 
conclusions are not entirely substantiated and provide no theoretical synthesis that can 
help us identify how biopolitics can manifest through the geographies of resistance. 
Framing life and death almost purely through the lens of state power, whether it is 
through direct bodily subjugation or institutional representation, ignores the possible 
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subaltern dimensions of biopolitics, which are phenomena that must be explored in 
greater detail.  
While I am arguing here that we must examine the biopolitics of subaltern 
resistance, I am also attempting to develop a more spatialized theory of a biopolitical 
geography of resistance. As I have argued, geographies of resistance desire to produce 
new geographies and aspire to change social space, which may occur through the 
performance of identity and violence. When studying the geographies of resistance 
through a scalar mode of analysis it is necessary to view resistance and the subsequent 
politics of transformation attached to it within a given spaces’ own localized scales. The 
purpose of this is to identify the social and political heterogeneities of agency and 
resistant power present within performed, resistance spaces. Resistant geographies can 
produce power within their own scales of resistance by virtue of the techniques within 
which resistance is operationalized. Relations between resistant geographies and the state 
as the only social relations that are present within performed space are not the only 
geographies at work; additionally, resistant geographies can produce scales of power and 
varieties of social relations within their own subaltern units and populations through 
performed resistance.  
This analytic of authenticating biopolitical geographies of resistance on localized 
scales also requires that we understand not just scales of power and their unique social 
relations in resistant spaces but also what I refer to as the scale of the body itself. 
Foucault’s biopolitics is rooted in the idea of “vital biological processes”, and the 
controls and mechanisms that may be instituted to insure the biological existence or lack 
thereof of a population, i.e. an investment in life for power’s interests. These 
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institutionalized mechanisms are in place to insure a population’s survival, or through the 
techniques of sovereignty and domination to insure a population’s decimation. Again, for 
Foucault the state is always the scale at which biopolitical regulation and population 
management is exercised. The vital biological processes of a population, however, are not 
just managed and regulated at the scale of the state, but are also managed within 
subaltern populations and by subaltern bodies themselves. The body plays a significant 
role in how, why and where resistant geographies are performed. Thus there can be 
different scales internally within subaltern populations in terms of the extent to which 
bodies become the direct vehicle of resisting power. Resistance may take the form of 
accessing the vulnerability of the body, yet such acts of resistance may or may not be 
uniform across all individuals within a given population. Some individuals and/or groups 
may resist by managing their vital biological processes extensively in a greater multitude 
of vulnerable, violent and damaging ways than others. Thus it is necessary to 
acknowledge the possible heterogeneity of scales with which individuals and/or groups 
may utilize the body in space when resisting state power and state violence.  
The multiple scales at which resistant bodies are manipulated and managed by the 
resisters themselves forms the foundation for what I will henceforth refer to as the 
biopolitical geography of resistance. Using this framework I analyze both GTMO and 
Pelican Bay’s hunger strikes’ social organization and internal power relations between 
groups and individuals. In answering my first and second research questions on how and 
why prisoners in these carceral spaces socially organize their resistance I emphasize the 
scales of participation in hunger striking, as well as the scale of the body. This theoretical 
framework opens doors to the consideration of the relationships between power, identity 
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and violence as exhibited by hunger striking resistance in spaces of incarceration and 
beyond.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
GUANTANAMO BAY 
 
History of the Military Base & the Prison 
 
 GTMO Bay was a territory that originally belonged to Cuba prior to and 
immediately after the Spanish-American War of 1898. After the Cubans and Americans 
defeated the Spanish and Cuba gained its sovereignty, the U.S. refused to relinquish its 
military presence in Cuba unless GTMO was legally leased to the U.S. While the Cuban 
legislature initially resisted this move, the Cuban president eventually ceded GTMO to 
the U.S. and agreed to the annual lease agreement (Hansen 2011). The 1903 Platt 
Amendment enabled the U.S. to keep its lease until a time at which it chose to return the 
territory to Cuba. This non-mutual agreement strategically enabled the U.S. to hold onto 
GTMO indefinitely, and prevented Cuba from ending the lease. The Platt agreement was 
amended by the Treaty of 1934, which was dictated by the U.S. The Treaty of 1934 
essentially reiterated the same language as the Platt Amendment, with the addition that in 
the case of an epidemic the U.S. would cease communications with the Cuban 
government (Hansen 2011). Since the Cuban revolution in 1959, the Castro government 
has refused to cash any of the lease checks sent by the U.S. (the cost of the lease is about 
$4,000 a year), in effect refusing to recognize GTMO as a U.S. territory (Hansen 2011; 
Greenberg 2009).   
 GTMO officially became a naval base in 1903, and during the first several 
decades that GTMO was a U.S. territory it served as a coaling station, training ground, 
and winter base for the naval fleet. In the 1920s both enlisted men and officers at GTMO 
were able to circumvent prohibition, and the base became an exceptional space at this 
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time relative to the military’s permissiveness regarding the legality of alcohol (Hansen 
2011). By the 1950s and 1960s the space served a very minimal purpose for the navy 
after it ceased functioning as a fueling station. During the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 
President Kennedy’s National Security Council advised him to relinquish GTMO to Cuba 
as a strategy for ending the crisis. While this might have ended the crisis sooner, 
Kennedy refused to do this because he believed doing so would compromise the U.S.’s 
image in the world as a global Cold War power (Hansen 2011).  
The purpose of the space began to change in the 1990s, when the base housed 
refugees during the political coup in Haiti. It was not until late 2001- early 2002 when the 
Department of Defense (hereinafter DOD) built the infrastructure for a prison within the 
naval base. The prison is operated under the auspices of the DOD within the naval base 
territory, with other naval and military operations functioning independently of the 
prison. Following the terrorist events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent U.S. 
invasion of Afghanistan, the National Security Council under President Bush began 
brainstorming as to where the alleged Taliban and Al Qaeda prisoners captured in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan should be incarcerated. In the fall of 2001 it was decided that 
GTMO was the best location to erect this prison (Hansen 2011; Greenberg 2009). When 
prisoners first arrived at GTMO on January 11, 2002, they lived in unhealthy and 
cramped conditions for the first several months of their detention, a result of a rushed 
construction of the prison’s infrastructural facilities (Hansen 2011; Greenberg 2009). 
It was in the first two years after the prison’s inception that the initial period of 
torture transpired. So-called ‘enhanced interrogation’ techniques, such as waterboarding, 
stress positions, long-term standing, sleep deprivation, and other torture methods were 
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utilized against prisoners between 2002 and 2003 (Greenberg 2009). These practices, 
which were also carried out at Baghram Air Force Base in Afghanistan and in the CIA 
rendition program in its so-called ‘black sites’ around the globe, eventually ceased after 
coming under public and political criticism regarding effectiveness and the 
interrogations’ lack of respect for human rights and the law. Available evidence suggests 
that the average person continues to believe in these geopolitical imaginations that 
represent GTMO detainees as terrorists (Morse 2013), believing that these particular 
torturous acts are still carried out; this is factually incorrect, however, in that these 
particular interrogation techniques were terminated by 2003 (Greenberg 2009). 
Nevertheless, prisoners continued to be detained indefinitely, without legal recourse or 
counsel, and have experienced other inequalities at the hands of the prison, the DOD and 
the U.S government. These inequalities and grievances have played their respective role 
in the production of hunger strike resistance.  
Geographical Literature on GTMO 
GTMO has been a space in which the state has exercised sovereign power in 
several capacities. Literature in geography has identified several of these manifestations 
of state power and authority. Minca (2005) argues that ultimate biopolitical power is 
demonstrated in the space of the camp, in that human life can be put in jeopardy and 
taken in such a geopolitical space. Minca argues that the space of the camp “is the most 
absolute biopolitical space that has ever been realized”, and that we must pay close 
attention to the politics of the exception. It is therefore imperative for us to engage with 
Giorgio Agamben’s work when discussing a space such as GTMO, in order to understand 
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the unstable threshold between life and death as an outcome of state sovereignty (Minca 
2005).  
Reid-Henry (2007) also suggests that Agamben’s thoughts on sovereignty have 
utility in discussing GTMO: “In short there is a need to examine the geographical 
mechanisms behind the production of bare life and its consignment to variously 
constituted spaces of exception whose particularity is a part of their very functioning” 
(2007, 632). Reid-Henry argues that we must ask questions regarding how the effects of 
sovereignty are realized differentially, specifically in relation to how bare life is produced 
in geopolitical space.   
 Morse (2013) has conducted a discourse analysis of the legal discursive 
geographies constructed by the U.S. government that represented GTMO detainees as 
terrorist bodies. This work demonstrates how the White House, the Justice Department’s 
Office of Legal Counsel and the Department of Defense were involved in a sophisticated 
institutional process of establishing discursive representations of prisoners. This elaborate 
institutional scheme, Morse argues, intentionally produced monikers that were 
geopolitical imaginations, and that it was through this discursive, representational power 
that detainee bodies were to be represented as deserving of torture and indefinite 
imprisonment. Morse refers to the representation of GTMO prisoners as the “carceral 
imagination”, i.e., a spectacle that enabled the U.S. to justify its actions in other regions 
of the world, namely in the Middle East with the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and later 
the Iraq invasion in 2003 (Morse 2013).  
These discussions of sovereignty, law and representation analyze the GTMO 
prison with unit of analysis of state power in managing this prison space. While these 
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accounts provide useful conceptual and theoretical tools for analyzing GTMO as a space 
of incarceration within the global war prison, I find that these studies mostly follow a 
similar line of reasoning regarding sovereignty and state-scale power. These studies lack 
the necessary frameworks for understanding subaltern scales of violence, power and 
identity, and the relationships thereof that are present within the prison’s geographies of 
hunger strike resistance. In the following section of this chapter I explore the chronology 
and social organization of the GTMO hunger strikes, and present empirical data 
regarding the subaltern scales within which power and violence are constructed in hunger 
strike resistance. Speaking generally, the reasons for hunger striking depend upon socio-
geographical setting and circumstance. The rationales for why prisoners choose to hunger 
strike at GTMO are varied, and will be discussed here in conjunction with the internal 
power structures and internal socio-organizational dynamics of hunger strike conduct. I 
begin by outlining particular periods in the prison’s history when there have been widely- 
publicized hunger strikes; following this I emphasize what I have found to be the most 
salient themes present during these periods of time as they relate to the social 
organization of hunger strikes, and the internal power relations that develop amongst 
prisoners. 
Hunger Strikes – Historical Developments 
The last known prisoner arrival at GTMO was in 2008 (Human Rights First 
2016). Overall GTMO has held 779 prisoners (Worthington 2007); this is cumulative, 
however, as there was never a single moment when the prison contained that many 
individuals. It is difficult to determine exactly how many prisoners were hunger strike 
participants at one time or another during the prison’s history; however, hunger strikes 
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have transpired in a myriad of organizational capacities and during certain periods of 
time since the prison was opened. 
While the precise date is unknown, internal government memoranda obtained 
through freedom of information act requests, client interviews by habeas legal counsel, as 
well as court records reveal that hunger strikes date back as far as the early months of 
2002 (Center for Constitutional Rights 2005). These earlier strikes, according to the 
military, were sporadic and did not involve many prisoners at a time, and consequently 
did not pose a significant risk to prisoners in terms of fatalities or injury. Statements 
given by released detainees originally from the UK, Afghanistan and Pakistan explain 
that one or more brief hunger strikes occurred in early 2002 in response to mistreatment 
of the Koran by a guard in Camp X-Ray. This strike ended following an apology given 
by an officer over the prison’s loudspeaker system; it was subsequently determined that 
guards were no longer permitted to handle the Koran except in the case of emergencies. 
Certain reports from former detainees believe the strike lasted three days, while others 
report it was an eight-day strike. The number of prisoners on hunger strike following this 
incident is unknown (Center for Constitutional Rights 2005).  
The first known hunger strike lasted from February 27 to May 10, 2002. This was 
reported to be a rolling hunger strike, caused by an MP removing a turban from a 
prisoner during prayer. Over the strike’s two-month period, prisoner involvement rose to 
a peak of 194 participants. An official statement from the GTMO Joint Task Force stated 
that 159 prisoners refused lunch and that another 109 refused dinner on February 27. On 
the following day it was officially reported that 107 refused breakfast and 194 refused 
dinner. A statement released by the public affairs officer for the Joint Task Force 
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regarding this hunger strike attempted to play down the scale of coordination that the 
prisoner population sought to manifest: “by no means is this an organized, concerted 
effort by the camp’s detainee population, but merely a demonstration of some of the 
detainees’ displeasure over the uncertainty of their future” (Center for Constitutional 
Rights 2005). By mid-March, three detainees who had refused both food and water for 
around a two-week period were force-fed fluids intravenously. By early May the number 
of strike participants had dwindled, as only two prisoners were reported to still be 
participating at this point. Both of these prisoners were ultimately force-fed – one after 63 
days, and another after 71 days of not eating (Center for Constitutional Rights 2005).  
It was not until the summer of 2005 when another larger-scale strike was reported 
similar to the two-month strike in 2002. From late June through most of July a hunger 
strike was carried out in all five camps of the detention center. According to attorneys 
from the law firm Shearman & Sterling, the prisoners described the strike as being a 
“peaceful, nonviolent strike” lasting “until demands are met”. The strike called for “no 
violence, by hand or even words, to anyone, including guards” and also stated the strike’s 
goal, “starvation until death” (Center for Constitutional Rights 2005). An imprisoned 
British resident provided some detail regarding the initial organization of this strike: 
“They began on June 21, 2005, by rejecting one meal each day for a week. On June 28, 
they began to reject two meals. On July 2, 2005, they began rejecting all food…A 
majority…are taking part in the hunger strike” (Center for Constitutional Rights 2005).  
While the DOD stated that 52 prisoners were hunger striking, attorneys 
representing the prisoners demonstrated that approximately 200 prisoners were 
participating in this strike (Center for Constitutional Rights 2005). This mass 
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organization prompted the prison administration to call for the creation of a Prisoners’ 
Council in order to negotiate with the prison authorities regarding prisoner demands. 
While the authorities requested the Prisoners’ Council, it was the prisoners themselves 
who organized and established this social unit. Based upon promises to bring the prison 
into compliance with Geneva Convention protections, the June-July hunger strike ended 
July 28 (Center for Constitutional Rights 2005). Unfortunately, however, Geneva 
Convention protections ultimately were not delivered to the prisoners, and consequently 
another hunger strike was initiated in mid-August. When the August strike began, the 
prison administration retaliated against the prisoners by placing the members of the 
Council in isolation (Center for Constitutional Rights 2005). The DOD acknowledged the 
August hunger strike on September 2, reporting the there had been prisoners on hunger 
strike since August 8. Lawyers reported that by October the number of strikers had 
diminished to 24 prisoners (Institute on Medicine as a Profession 2013).  
Following a report of a guard disrespecting the Koran in February 2013, another 
large-scale strike arose. This strike lasted until at least November, as the DOD released 
the number of prisoners on strike from the emergence of the strike in February until 
November, when the DOD stopped releasing striker numbers. The strike eventually rose 
to a total of 106 in July. The graph below (figure 1) represents the growth and decline of 
strike participation during this movement (Miami Herald 2013): 
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Figure 1. Guantanamo Hunger Strike: Adapted from Miami Herald, 2013. 
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As is illustrated in figure 1, between mid-April and mid-August, around 100 prisoners 
were hunger striking continuously. Also illustrated in this graph is the number of 
prisoners that were force-fed as well as the number of strikers who were hospitalized and 
put on IVs during this time. Those who are hospitalized experienced severe medical 
complications from not eating for sustained periods of time (Center for Constitutional 
Rights 2005). Understandably, the number of prisoners being force-fed fluctuated relative 
to the number of prisoners hunger striking.  
Definitions, Categorizations, and Social Organization of Hunger Striking 
In conducting interviews with attorneys who have represented GTMO prisoners 
and physicians hired by the defense who have medically counseled detainees, particular 
themes have become evident in my research regarding how prisoners socially organize 
their resistance movements. Most notable of the characteristics of hunger strike social 
organization and power structures are 1) the relationship between the group and the 
individual, as well as 2) cultural and religious factors that affect execution of hunger 
strikes. Having outlined some general chronology regarding hunger strikes that have 
transpired at GTMO, below I highlight the power relations and socio-organizational 
elements present in these periods of resistance. I identify the lawyers from my interviews 
by a number (i.e. lawyer 1, lawyer 2, etc.) in order to protect confidentiality.  
A prisoner is officially considered a hunger striker by the prison authorities after 
having missed nine meals. Once prisoners drop below a certain percentage of their body 
weight they are force-fed nutritional supplements if they do not voluntarily drink them. 
The International Committee for the Red Cross (hereinafter ICRC) outlines three general 
definitions of hunger strikers. These include ‘true’ hunger strikers, ‘non-total fasters’ and 
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‘dry’ hunger strikers (Institute on Medicine as a Profession 2013). Dry hunger striking is 
a very dangerous form of hunger striking where a striker consumes neither food nor 
water. An individual who does this cannot survive longer than a few days. This form of 
hunger striking is very uncommon because not drinking water would be 
counterproductive – a hunger striker requires time for their resistance to be 
acknowledged, and so rapid bodily deterioration by not consuming water would not be a 
useful tactic to most hunger strikers. So-called ‘non-total’ hunger striking refers to taking 
other nutrients, vitamins or any other supplements beyond just drinking water. A ‘true’ 
hunger striker is one who consumes no solid food of any kind, only taking water 
(Institute on Medicine as Profession 2013). Force-feeding is a method of negative 
reinforcement, used by the authorities as a technique to try and break the hunger strikes. 
The DOD’s perspective, formalized in 2006, is that hunger strikes are acts of self-harm 
rather than forms of resistance; this enables the DOD to characterize force-feeding as a 
life-saving measure, and justifies the violence and extreme physical discomfort implicit 
in inserting and removing feeding tubes three times a day (Institute on Medicine as a 
Profession 2013).  
While prisoners are classified under these discursive groupings, their official 
status as a hunger striker must be further determined by psychiatric evaluation. If a 
prisoner is psychiatrically determined to be hunger striking for a rational reason, and if 
they are resisting on their own accord based on personal convictions or decisions, this 
denotes hunger strike status. It is worth noting, however, that the social organization of 
hunger striking at GTMO does not operate within categories that are as neatly defined by 
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the ICRC, which have been adopted by the prison authorities. As lawyer 1 explained to 
me, these definitions often mean very little to the prisoners when they are striking: 
AM: From the perspective of the ICRC definitions that give the criteria for 
what defines a hunger strike, missing nine meals completely is the criteria 
that defines it officially? 
 
Lawyer 1: Well, who gives a damn what they say. I mean, that's not what 
matters is it? The fact that they define a hunger strike by nine missed 
meals. That's got nothing to do with what these prisoners do. The 
prisoners define it the way they want to define it. A lot of them miss, you 
know, five thousand meals. 
 
As I explain in the section above on the history of GTMO’s hunger strikes, the 2005 
strike was coordinated by missing one meal a day for a week, which prisoners thereafter 
expanded into missing two meals several days later, and then all meals in the days 
following. As stated above, there are conflicting definitions of what constitutes a hunger 
strike or hunger strike involvement at GTMO. While certain categorizations exist on the 
side of the prison administration and its medical professionals in terms of what prisoners 
must do to be officially considered a hunger striker, prisoners seek to define their status 
as hunger strikers on their own terms outside of these official categorizations. While the 
GTMO medical establishment has significantly adopted the ICRC definitions, prisoners 
do not seek to conduct their hunger striking based on such official categorizations of not 
eating. 
In conducting my initial interview(s) it was unclear from the dialogue just how 
deeply organized the GTMO prison population has been in hunger strike resistance. A 
psychiatrist that I interviewed was skeptical of the extent to which the strikes were 
socially coordinated, and stated that he believed that the organizational aspects of the 
hunger strikes were not deeply embedded:  
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This is a network of guys. I don’t know if anybody is a leader. I 
haven’t seen anything to indicate to me that there’s that kind of mentality 
amongst them or that they’re organized like that…there’s a lot of 
individuals with a lot of individual interests. I don’t think it worked – I 
just don’t see that as realistic at all… there can always be a common 
feeling, I mean we see it on college campuses all the time; something 
lights everybody up and they just do what they need to do. And there is a 
leadership that’s there, it is ad hoc, and then it kind of fades, you know, 
and sometimes these things have a life of their own. So I’m not so sure 
they’re that organized. I mean I’ve never seen anything that indicates to 
me that they’re that organized… I just don’t see why it had to be fought as 
if it was an organized protest where there’s leadership. I’m not so sure. It 
may be. 
 
Lawyer 3 also stated that the hunger strikes were, to his knowledge, “not that organized”. 
These passages explain that while the strikes have had some level of organization, they 
should be represented as not being extremely centralized in their operation. And while 
there have been long-standing grievances within the prison population, such as indefinite 
detention and lack of legal access, there was a particular tripping point that initiated some 
of if not several of the hunger strikes at GTMO. My conversations with attorneys have 
allowed me to gain a clearer representation of the social organization and power relations 
present in the conduct of the hunger strikes, which I focus on in the remainder of this 
chapter.  
The hunger strike in the summer of 2005 saw the outcome of the Prisoners’ 
Council. As mentioned above, this Council, whose creation was requested by the prison 
administration, was organized and established by the prison population itself. The 
Council’s purpose was to represent the rest of the prisoners and negotiate with the 
authorities regarding prisoner demands, which the commanding officer hoped would end 
the strike. The prisoners demanded that the prison and U.S. government extend the 
Geneva Convention to them, which the commanding officer sought to do, as establishing 
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a Prisoners’ Council in the case of prisoners of war is required under the Convention. The 
prison population nominated six prisoners to establish this structure; however, this was 
accomplished partly with practicality in mind, and the prisoners who were chosen or 
elected to be on the Council were prisoners who also spoke English, in order to be able to 
comfortably and effectively communicate with the guards and prison authorities in the 
negotiations.  
This council was only in operation as an intermediary between the prisoners and 
the administration for a brief period of two or three weeks, as the commanding officer 
who instigated the Council was removed from power for attempting to extend the Geneva 
Convention to the prisoners. It was the removal of the administration’s recognition of the 
Council, as mentioned above, that sparked the following hunger strike in August. 
Interestingly, however, despite the administration’s dismissal of the Council, the prison 
population did not dissolve this structure, and the Council remained as a force to a certain 
extent after the summer of 2005. According to an attorney, this remains as a social 
structure to this day: “…each prison block would basically elect a leader. It was normally 
the person who could interact most effectively with the guards, so it was normally again 
someone who spoke English”.  
Lawyer 2 explained that the Council was a “power structure that is not binding” in 
that there is not strong discipline or centralization of power because of the Council’s 
structure. In asking lawyer 1 if prisoners are purely expected to follow the Council’s 
interests and decisions, lawyer 1 explained that the structure was not quite this rigid: 
…it isn't that sort of ‘Come with us and I'm gonna tell you what to do’[. It 
really is the interface. So when the guards get out of hand, or the prisoners 
need something, that's when the block leader intervenes, and kind of talks 
it down as opposed to everyone getting a big old bash-on. It's not the kind 
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of thing where I'm elected block leader, so now we have a trade union, and 
we're going to start, you know, asserting our rights. It's not really that. 
 
As this passage demonstrates, the prisoners in the Council function as a sort of 
representative group for the rest of the prison population, who in a way assume the 
responsibility of hunger striking so other prisoners do not have to or do not need to 
become involved. At an even more micro scale within the Prisoners’ Council, 
negotiations occur regarding the best technique for the individuals in that group to resist. 
Decisions within the Council are frequently made by mutual agreement with the other 
group members. Attorney 1 explains this social process: 
Depending on who they are, there's a core group of six of the very long-
term prisoners who have been force-fed for years. They had reached a 
level of accommodation. This included (name redacted)… he was 
absolutely committed to what he was doing, but on the other hand he 
wasn't a masochist. So he reached an accommodation with the other five 
guys, so the guys would let him walk to the force-feeding chair where he 
would walk once a day where they drink the revolting stuff in a can... And 
then the other times they would make him stick it up his nose. So you've 
got those compromises.  
 
The Prisoners’ Council ultimately prefers that strikers engage in completely involuntary 
consumption of solid food and nutrients in their hunger strikes; however, with the consent 
of the Council members, exceptions are made to this expectation.  
 There is a certain degree of freedom GTMO prisoners have in taking part or not 
taking part in hunger striking. Prisoners are not expected to become involved should they 
have extra-medical reasons, such as pre-existing medical conditions that could be 
exacerbated by not eating for lengths of time. The Council and wider prison population 
strongly respect these limitations. While group movements are often more recognized, 
these strikes are only one technique of hunger strike protest. What is unique about the 
GTMO hunger strikes is that prisoners can conduct their own personal, individualized 
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strikes without the rest of the population becoming involved. Lawyer 1 explains the 
absence of group restrictions in strike conduct: 
AM: It's socially acceptable, I suppose, for people at Guantanamo to go on 
hunger strike even if there isn't a wider scale strike going on at the same 
time? 
 
Lawyer 1: Oh yeah, oh yeah. And indeed there's necessity for the social 
group, the current group who are five or six people now, sort of designated 
by consensus, to continue the strike. You know, they tell the other 
prisoners you don't need to die there, I'll carry the torch, that's really what 
it's all about. 
 
As stated above, the Council assumes a level of responsibility in striking for the rest of 
the population. Additionally, however, a mass strike does not need to be occurring for 
prisoners to hunger strike. According to one attorney, the strikes can be broken up into 
two categories, one being the mass-scale strikes – such as the 2005 and 2013 movements 
– and two being the individualized strikes, in which prisoners strike off-and-on, and resist 
more voluntarily by actively choosing to drink the nutritional supplements instead of 
receiving them by force-feeding. An individual prisoner striking on-and-off outside of the 
group is expected to speak with the Council regarding their potential plans to strike, 
including for how long and what his particular personal grievances are; as the psychiatrist 
explained in the quote above, there are many individuals with a variety of interests, which 
may not be reflected by the wider group’s interests during a movement. No attorneys 
could recall any situation in which the Council suggested that a particular prisoner should 
not participate in their own hunger strike, outside of a prisoner having previous medical 
complications. And even if the Council advises prisoners not to strike because of standing 
health issues, prisoners may still exercise their right to protest regardless.  
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Within group movements and individualized off-and-on strikes, the question 
arises as to what extent prisoners make the decision to strike on their own accord. 
Attorney 2 stated that he “never felt like (his) clients were pressured” to participate in a 
hunger strike. That being said, lawyer 2 emphasized that many prisoners join in because 
they do not wish to feel left out of the struggle. Because of the legal ambiguities, 
indefinite detention, cultural disrespect and other abuses, this attorney explains that “it 
would be impossible for you not to hunger strike” if a movement is occurring, and since 
“all your brothers are hunger striking” you would have “no choice” but to participate. 
Thus while the Council maintains a social structure that is not binding, there is some 
scale of social anticipation regarding the extent to which other prisoners should resist, in 
addition to the potential violent outcomes of certain forms of resistance.  
To drink the nutritional supplements means that one is voluntarily consuming 
nutrients, which in the eyes of many prisoners is not true resistance. Prisoners most 
frequently see themselves as true hunger strikers when they put themselves in the 
vulnerable situation of potentially being force-fed. According to both attorney 1 and 
attorney 2, it is often the case that in order to be a true resister and a true hunger striker 
prisoners must also not voluntarily walk to be force-fed; rather some prisoners comply 
with being forcibly extracted from their cell by the ‘Extreme Reaction Force’ squad of six 
guards, who violently beat prisoners and drag them out of their cells on restraint chairs so 
they may be taken to be force-fed. The preference for completely involuntary, true 
hunger striking by enduring force-feeding was a common phenomenon not just in the 
2005 strike but also in the 2013 strike. This outcome occurs within and outside of the six-
member Prisoners’ Council.  
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 A further characteristic of the social organization and internal power structures 
present in the GTMO hunger strikes reflects the cultural affiliations prisoners have with 
one another. The entire prison population is made up of Muslim men, which, according to 
an attorney, is a factor that establishes collective mentalities in hunger strike resistance. 
While the prison population is constituted by numerous nationalities, Islam is a unifying 
factor in hunger strike operationalization and organization. It is widely publicized, and 
confirmed in my interviews, that the 2013 strike was initiated because of Koran 
desecration by a guard. Lawyer 2 explained that the strike took off, with minimal to no 
prior planning, immediately following this act of abuse and disrespect, and as the above 
graph shows, the number of strike participants rose drastically within two to three weeks. 
A performance of this scale for these reasons illustrates the importance of religion in 
constructing a group movement.  
While the Prisoners’ Council was established by consensus, lawyer 2 clarified that 
it was imams who made up the Council. Imams are religious leaders in Islam, and it is 
due to religious status and title that prisoners listen to the Council. Being imams, the 
Council members have the authority to call for a strike, a technique of power that is in 
part granted to them due to their religious status. Interestingly, these imams in the 
Council became religious leaders at GTMO, and were not Islamic clergymen by trade in 
their home countries prior to being captured in late 2001. These men, aside from being 
English speakers, are respected because of the spiritual knowledge or awareness they are 
said to have. It is for this reason that prisoners follow suggestions from the imams and 
pay heed to Council members. An attorney emphasized that prisoners feel obligated to 
discuss their options as on-and-off hunger strikers, resisting outside of a mass movement, 
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as they believe respect is due to the imams when exercising their personal decision to 
hunger strike. Since the imams in the Council can call for the strikes because of their 
spiritual/religious status, some social hierarchy exists in calls for mass resistance. 
 While these cultural and religious elements affect collective organization and 
collaboration in hunger striking, it is possible that religious identity may preclude 
prisoners from resisting by not eating. The one psychiatrist I spoke to informed me that 
he has had clients who take issue with hunger striking because of religious beliefs: 
…that gets them into a real dilemma with regard to religious convictions, 
because suicide is condemned in Islam. And they have to decide – I had 
one man say to me he decided to stop his hunger strike…He said ‘by 
hunger striking I’m killing my stomach. That’s condemned, I can’t do 
this’. So that’s a particular interpretation of the theology that others may 
not share. It has just a lot of variation I think. 
 
It is unclear to me how widespread this phenomenon is at GTMO; this quote is partly a 
reference to one prisoner, and I am uncertain as to how frequently prisoners overall share 
this interpretation and choose not to hunger strike because suicide is condemned in Islam. 
I sought to confirm this information with attorney 1: 
AM: Religion is a significant factor, as (name redacted) explained to me, 
with some prisoners. They feel like hunger striking is not something that 
they can do because of Islam, and I'm curious as to what extent this 
phenomenon is true. 
 
Lawyer 1: I've never heard someone say they can't hunger strike because 
of Islam…I'd be quite surprised. I mean, look, there may be a pretext, but 
back in 2013, the overwhelming majority of prisoners struck. All of the 
ones who took their religion seriously struck. The people who didn't were 
generally the ones who were sick, and then there were some who were just 
being compliant with the guards, but I never heard anyone say they 
couldn't do it because it's against their religion. 
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While it is challenging to represent this phenomenon, such limitations in hunger striking 
based on religious identity appear minimal, both with hunger striking individually on-
and-off and within group movements.  
Social Patterns in Hunger Strike Social Organization at GTMO 
 All in all, there have been two overarching themes that I have discovered in my 
research regarding the power relations and social organization governing the GTMO 
hunger strikes. There is an important social relationship between the larger group of 
prisoners striking together and those who strike separately outside of a movement. 
Culture/religion is a factor in how prisoners socially coordinate and organize their 
resistance. Prisoners maintain a social obligation to their fellow prisoners, as well as the 
religious leaders in the Council, and often feel that they are bound to resist should they 
not have a preexisting medical excuse. Based on the data presented here, we can see that 
while they are expected to have some social responsibility to the imams in the Prisoners’ 
Council, prisoners can make their own choices to a significant degree; they may strike 
voluntarily by actively drinking the nutritional supplements, or they may strike by 
entirely involuntary means in submitting to force-feedings and forcible cell-extractions. 
Techniques of resistance and forms of social organization are not set in stone but rather 
are fluid, and while prisoners negotiate with the imams and one another, they are not 
bound to the group norms. Thus the GTMO hunger strikes have a libertarian quality 
attached to them with regard to how prisoners negotiate power relations and socially 
coordinate their resistance.  
 While these geographies of resistance in this carceral space are defined by 
nonbinding power structures and individual freedom in protest technique and duration, 
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this phenomenon is not necessarily uniform in other spaces of confinement. As we turn 
our attention in the next chapter to hunger striking at Pelican Bay and throughout the 
California prison system, we will see that the power relations between the group and the 
individual are not nearly as permissive in how prisoners socially organize their resistance. 
While social organization may be permissive at GTMO in several capacities, we will see 
how Pelican Bay hunger strikers are brought together collectively by strong associations 
of group identity that transcend the social scales of hunger strike commitment at GTMO.  
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CHAPTER IV 
PELICAN BAY 
Solitary Confinement & History of the California Prison System 
Supermax prison development in California began in the late 1980s; Pelican Bay 
state prison and its solitary housing units were made operable in 1989, and Corcoran state 
prison was opened in 1988 (Reiter 2013). Between 1984 and 1996, California constructed 
23 new prison facilities (Gilmore 2007; Reiter 2013). California converted additional 
prison space to supermax status during the 1990s, and tens of thousands of solitary 
housing units (hereinafter SHU) were built over the next twenty years. In 1995 Corcoran 
state prison in the central valley converted another 512-bed unit into a supermax unit, and 
in 2000 the CDCR opened an overflow supermax unit at Tehachapi state prison with a 
further 378 cells. The CDCR also operated a 44-cell supermax unit for women at Valley 
State Prison throughout these years. Between 1990 and 2006 the California prison 
population doubled, reaching 173,000 prisoners. Since the introduction of supermax units 
in California in the late 1980s, California’s supermax population has consistently been 
2% of the state’s overall prison population (Reiter 2013). State correctional spending 
increased steadily with the rising prison population, and between 1980 and 2012 
spending increased by 436% (Reiter 2013). In most California state prisons, the state 
government spends an average of $49,000 per prisoner per year; however, at Pelican Bay, 
the state’s main supermax facility, it costs the state more than $70,000 per prisoner per 
year (Reiter 2013).  
Overcrowding further complicates the pattern of mass incarceration in California. 
The number of beds in California prisons frequently has remained behind population 
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increases. As of 1993, a lawsuit, Madrid vs. Gomez, revealed that approximately half of 
the beds in the Pelican Bay supermax were double-bunked (Reiter 2013). Over the last 
twenty years, this policy of bunking two prisoners within a supermax cell has been 
common in California. Between 1993 and 1997 double-bunking rates peaked in the 
Corcoran and Pelican Bay SHUs, when between 40% and 70% of all supermax cells were 
double-bunked. Today at Pelican Bay, double-bunking rates are around 10%, while at 
Corcoran and Tehachapi the rates remain higher, at 60% and 100%, respectively.  
There are numerous gangs that constitute California’s prison populations, 
determined by white, latino and black racial-ethnic affiliations (Noll 2012). These include 
the Aryan Brotherhood, a white supremacist group; the Bloods and the Crips, both 
African-American gangs which, while having a national presence, are based in Los 
Angeles; the Northern and Southern Mexicans, i.e. the Mexican Mafia, who are a 
Mexican-American organization from Los Angeles; Nuestra Familia (Norteños), mostly 
based in Northern California; the Sureños, from southern California; and the Black 
Guerrilla family, known for their Marxist and Communist ideologies (Noll 2012). 
Historically many of these racially based organizations have been known for violent 
conflict with other racial groups in and out of prison. Many prisoners enter a maximum-
security prison such as Pelican Bay already members of a gang (Reiter 2012), and it is a 
prisoner’s potential gang status that affects whether or not that prisoner is placed in 
solitary confinement.   
Supermax prisons and solitary housing units are ultimately prisons within prisons 
(Reiter 2013). This enables SHUs to be exceptional spaces that have been able to 
circumvent legal oversight since their inception, what Angela Davis refers to as “extra-
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legal” punishment (Reiter 2013). In the first few years following the opening of Pelican 
Bay, reports of abuse began trickling out of the prison. The California legislature and 
governor began receiving letters from prisoners outlining exploitation and harsh living 
conditions in solitary confinement (Reiter 2013). A class action lawsuit, Madrid vs. 
Gomez, was launched in 1995 regarding these abuses. The lawsuit’s plaintiffs were SHU 
prisoners, dozens of whom reported comas, fractured ribs, torture and brain damage, 
among other forms of physical abuse. The Madrid case illustrated that correctional 
officers conceal information about goings-on in the prison through a ‘code of silence’ 
regarding issues of force because of possible retaliation for speaking out about such 
exploitation (Reiter 2013). Reiter explains how the case also revealed that guards do not 
have written guidelines for executing their tasks in managing prisoners:  
In sum, correctional officers had control over every aspect of day-to-day 
conditions of confinement with Pelican Bay prisoners, from whether 
prisoners were housed with violent cellmates to whether prisoners are 
allowed out of their cells into the shower or exercise yard, whether they 
were given medical or mental health treatment, and whether they were 
beaten up or burned, or not (2013, 152).   
 
In addition to power within the SHU, power over who actually gets sent to the 
SHU rests not with the courts or the legal system, but rather with the California 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (hereinafter CDCR). The CDCR and its 
correctional officers are able to utilize ultimate discretion in determining if prisoners are 
placed within the general population or in the SHU. A prisoner is placed in the SHU 
either for a rule violation, for a period of time lasting a few months to several years, or 
the prisoner may be labeled by the authorities as a gang member and can placed in the 
SHU for an indeterminate period of time, potentially lasting beyond a prisoners’ original 
criminal sentence (Reiter 2013).  
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The conditions of confinement in the SHU can change for any prisoner at any 
time. If prisoners correspond or have observed associations with other known gang 
members, or possess any other visual representations the administration associates with 
gang membership, such as gang tattoos, correctional officers may make determinations to 
place prisoners in the SHU indefinitely. A prisoners’ theoretical gang affiliation is often 
also based upon spoken word, guard contacts between different prisons within the 
California system, prisoners’ files or records, or any combination thereof. Gang 
identification is significantly engineered by prison authorities and is largely predatory, 
i.e., prisoners are intentionally labeled as such in order to establish norms for solitary 
incarceration (Goodman 2008). Thus supposed gang status is a technique of power for the 
CDCR, as this method of labeling is a process of discursive and social construction for 
indefinite detention. 
Although the Madrid vs. Gomez case found that guards’ actions at Pelican Bay 
had violated the U.S. constitution in regard to prohibitions against cruel and unusual 
punishment, the court never found that the conditions of long-term solitary confinement 
themselves were inherently unconstitutional. The outcome of the case saw the court 
working with lawyers and monitors to ensure that adequate policies were in place to 
preclude any abuses that were articulated in the suit (Reiter 2013). Furthermore, Madrid 
protected some of the most vulnerable prisoners in the SHU by raising standards for 
guard training and permitting minimal but greater legal due process in supermax 
confinement (Reiter 2013).  
Other legal cases in the 1990s challenged the vague and discretionary rules 
permitting correctional officers’ ability to ‘validate’ a prisoner’s possible gang 
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membership, which frequently results in prisoners being placed in the SHU for an 
indefinite period of time. In Castillo vs. Alameida, a prisoner filed a claim arguing that he 
was placed in the SHU indefinitely as retaliation for working as a jailhouse lawyer 
(Reiter 2013). After nine years of ongoing litigation, Castillo, the plaintiff, agreed to a 
settlement that promised substantial revisions to California’s prison gang validation 
procedures. In particular, the settlement required that the CDCR provide prisoners with 
the actual documentation being used as evidence to validate their gang membership, in 
addition to extending prisoners the opportunity to refute such claims. This decision in 
effect further limited guards’ ability to depend upon hearsay evidence by word of mouth 
from informants, and also called for 6-month reviews to re-illustrate that prisoners 
continued to be active gang members in order to justify their indefinite incarceration 
(Reiter 2013).  
Despite the reforms brought by this litigation, courts continued to rule that long-
term and indefinite solitary confinement was constitutional. The average length of time a 
prisoner spends in the Pelican Bay SHU prior to release is 2.5 years, whereas the average 
length of stay in the Corcoran SHU is six months (Reiter 2013). Again, these numbers 
refer to prisoners who end up being released from solitary, as many prisoners have spent 
years and sometimes decades in the SHU. As of 2011, there were more than 500 
prisoners who had spent greater than five years in the Pelican Bay SHU – 291 prisoners 
had been in the SHU longer than ten years, and 78 prisoners had spent 20 years or more 
in solitary confinement (Reiter 2013). Many prisoners may never be released from the 
SHU. A common phrase ‘parole, snitch or die’ is used in prison to illustrate this lack of 
mobility (Reiter 2012). This slang refers to the three ways in which a prisoner may leave 
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the SHU: he can be paroled from his sentence, he can renounce his gang membership by 
‘debriefing’ (i.e., naming names of other possible gang members and sharing information 
about gang activity so that he can be moved into ‘protective custody’ or the general 
population), or he can die in the SHU (Reiter 2012). While debriefing to get relocated 
from the SHU may sound appealing, this choice is frowned upon by most prisoners since 
this forces them to renounce their identities to the authorities in order to live in conditions 
where they have a few more freedoms. Selling out themselves and their social and 
cultural group is something prisoners usually refuse to do. Furthermore, this technique 
has manufactured violence between racial groups, in that if a prisoner ‘snitches’ then that 
prisoner may be retaliated upon (by their own racial group or another) if they are moved 
to general population, where it will be very difficult if not impossible for the guards to 
protect a prisoner who has debriefed.  
The CDCR’s argument is that they can mitigate and prevent gang violence 
through the debriefing process. This has proven not to be effective, and instead has 
historically produced more violence within the prison population (Reiter 2013). Changing 
this policy was one of the prisoners’ major goals in the 2011 and 2013 hunger strikes at 
Pelican Bay and throughout the wider California prison system.  
Chronological Developments of the Pelican Bay Hunger Strikes 
The SHU’s presence as a space of indeterminate incarceration, existing outside 
the direct rule of law, shaped the rationale and justifications for the 2011 and 2013 
California prison hunger strikes. Below I outline the sequence of hunger strikes that 
transpired at Pelican Bay and throughout the California prison system between 2011 and 
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2013, and following this I present data illustrating the internal power relations and micro- 
scale social organization of the hunger strikes.  
Members of the so-called ‘Short Corridor Collective’ originally planned the 
strikes in the SHU. In 2011 and 2013 the Short Corridor prisoners launched three hunger 
strikes, largely driven by a homogenization of racial groups protesting together as a 
collective unit. In February 2011 the Short Corridor sent their demands to the Governor 
and CDCR officials (Prison Focus 2012). As these demands were initially ignored, the 
Pelican Bay SHU planned and executed multiple hunger strikes. The first began July 1 
2011, lasting about three weeks. The July strike transpired not just at Pelican Bay but also 
at another eight prisons in the California system, with 5300 prisoners striking altogether 
on July 1, according to the CDCR (Reiter 2013). By July 3, the CDCR documented 6,600 
prisoners refusing meals at 13 different prison facilities in California (Prison Focus 2012; 
Center for Constitutional Rights 2016). The second 2011 strike was initiated September 
26, and lasted until October 15 involving approximately 12,000 participants across the 
California prison system (Center for Constitutional Rights 2016). This strike was 
terminated following the CDCR’s promise to review all current SHU assignments. In 
March 2012, the CDCR proposed a new Security Threat Group Management Strategy, 
which was essentially a further proposal for adding steps to the debriefing process 
(Center for Constitutional Rights 2016. At this time the Center for Constitutional Rights 
joined the lawsuit originally filed by the Short Corridor prisoners themselves (Center for 
Constitutional Rights 2016). Dissatisfied with the lack of initiative on the part of the 
Governor and CDCR’s lack of a plan for ending long-term indefinite solitary 
confinement, a third strike lasting 60 days was initiated on July 8 2013. At its start, over 
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30,000 prisoners throughout the California system had joined in on the strike. By the end 
of the strike two months later at Pelican Bay, it is reported that about 40 prisoners were 
still consistently striking. The strike was suspended as of September 5, when California 
lawmakers agreed to hold hearings to address the Short Corridor’s demands (Center for 
Constitutional Rights 2016). While these hunger strikes operating across racial groups 
received publicity, hunger strikes of fewer participants had transpired previously in the 
Pelican Bay SHU, dating back to as early as 2001 (Earle 2015). While it is difficult to 
know exact numbers, these strikes involved limited participation in comparison to the 
hundreds and thousands of prisoners striking in 2011 and 2013 (Earle 2015). 
The Social Organization of the Pelican Bay & CA Prison Hunger Strikes 
Below I present data taken from prisoner letters sent to California Prison Focus, a 
prison rights group in Oakland, before and during the 2011 and 2013 hunger strikes. The 
data presented from these chosen letters speak to the power structures present in the 
social organization of the resistance. While some of these letters are public, the majority 
of them were collected from the files of California Prison Focus. I identify prisoners by a 
number, as prisoners’ names were redacted prior to viewing them in CPF’s files. Letters 
from prisoners participating in the hunger strikes at Pelican Bay as well as Corcoran are 
examined, and are therefore identified as such (ex. Pelican Bay prisoner 1, Corcoran 
prisoner 2, etc.). In examining these letters, two general themes arose regarding the social 
organization of the strikes; these include 1) the leadership structure present in strike 
planning and operationalization and 2) the ways and extent to which prisoners were 
committed to resisting. While these two themes are evident throughout many of the 
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passages shared here below, I have separated quotes based on how salient I believe a 
theme is illustrated in a passage.  
I also present data from two interviews; one was conducted with a former prison 
rights activist and medical doctor also affiliated with California Prison Focus who is 
familiar with the medical context of hunger striking. In the second interview I spoke with 
a former prisoner and prison rights activist who is the editor of Prison Focus and who is 
familiar with gang organization and prison resistance movements. It is useful to examine 
discourse from these interviews here because they provide a critical perspective on 
hunger strike social organization that is not necessarily explained through prisoners’ own 
ethnographic accounts of strike planning and social coordination in their letters.  In the 
final section of the chapter I bring these two themes together and discuss the social 
patterns in hunger strike social organization based on this data.  
The grievances that justified the strikes were originally written by the Short 
Corridor Collective and were articulated through what the Collective termed the Five 
Core Demands. These were mailed to the CDCR and the Governor of California, as 
stated above, and for publicity were also distributed to CPF in Oakland, and were 
published in CPF’s newsletter, Prison Focus, which eventually circulated through the 
SHU. The Five Core Demands were released in the spring of 2011 (Center for 
Constitutional Rights 2015) and were written as the following: 
  Perceived gang membership is one of the leading reasons for placement 
in solitary confinement.  
  The practice of “debriefing,” or offering up information about fellow 
prisoners particularly regarding gang status, is often demanded in return 
for better food or release from the SHU. Debriefing puts the safety of 
prisoners and their families at risk, because they are then viewed as 
“snitches.”  
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  The validation procedure used by the California Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) employs such criteria as tattoos, 
readings materials, and associations with other prisoners (which can 
amount to as little as greeting) to identify gang members.  
  Many prisoners report that they are validated as gang members with 
evidence that is clearly false or using procedures that do not follow the 
Castillo v. Alameida settlement which restricted the use of photographs to 
prove association.  
 
Thus the SHU prisoners were requesting that gang identity be respected by asking that 
debriefing be terminated; the attempted authoritative crackdown puts prisoners in a 
position to be easily manipulated, and debriefing should be abolished because it does not 
limit prison violence. These demands were suggested as an ultimatum in April 2011 
before SHU prisoners began their first hunger strike over the summer. 
The Short Corridor prisoners who were labeled as gang leaders by the prison 
authorities had been moved into the same pod in the SHU in years prior. The CDCR’s 
objective in isolating prisoners this way was an attempt to obstruct prisoners’ potential 
ability to mobilize other prisoners. The spatial proximity established between these 
particular prisoners did the opposite, however, and enabled them to organize collective 
resistance. Pragmatically speaking, while communication is slow and can be challenging, 
prisoners can yell between cells and pods in order to plan and organize. The Pelican Bay 
SHU prisoners sought to resist social categorization and characterization as members of 
racialized and violent prison gangs through protesting in this fashion. Furthermore, prior 
to the first hunger strike in 2011, the Short Corridor Collective released their “Agreement 
to End Hostilities”. This agreement was decided upon by consensus within the Short 
Corridor, and called for prisoners to cease inter-gang violence: 
If we really want to bring about substantive meaningful changes to the 
CDCR system in a manner beneficial to all solid individuals, who have 
never been broken by CDCR’s torture tactics intended to coerce one to 
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become a state informant via debriefing, that now is the time for us to 
collectively seize this moment, and put an end to more than 20-30 years of 
hostilities between our racial groups…all racial group hostilities need to 
be at an end…and if personal issues arise between individuals, people 
need to do all they can to exhaust all diplomatic means to settle such 
disputes; do not allow personal, individual issues to escalate into racial 
group issues…we must all hold strong to our mutual agreement from this 
point on and focus our time, attention and energy on mutual causes 
beneficial to all of us and our best interests. 
 
All members of the Short Corridor Collective signed this agreement when it was 
distributed, which totaled 17 SHU prisoners. The decision to end inter-gang animosities 
was called by this select group of prisoners, and seeks to speak for the rest of the SHU 
population. The Collective speaks in an informative tone, stating that it is in everyone’s 
interest to cease any aggression that exists within or between gangs. The Collective 
attempts to speak on behalf of all SHU prisoners here as a select group of people 
representing hundreds if not thousands of others. Below I focus further on the power the 
Short Corridor had in orchestrating strike conduct, and how effective this group mentality 
was in coordinating resistance.  
CPF’s summer edition of Prison Focus, Issue 37, contains an article titled 
“Hunger Strike Clarification”, in which Pelican Bay prisoner 1, also a Short Corridor 
member, states “This peaceful HS protest is not ‘led’ by any individual or group; it was 
deemed necessary after more than a year of discussion and thought amongst many PBSP-
SHU prisoners from all races.” This illustrates that the Short Corridor did not want to 
establish a hierarchy in the social organization of the strikes, whether from the Short 
Corridor or from any one racial group. Furthermore, this prisoner explained that this was 
a peaceful hunger strike, and is not and should not be considered to be an offensive tactic. 
In this same issue, in an article titled “HS Thoughts” Pelican Bay and Short Corridor 
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prisoner 2 corroborates that the strike July 2011 strike is to include SHU prisoners from 
all races acting together as one in the struggle. This prisoner also suggests how prisoners 
become involved or not:  
To the HS participants themselves, we recommend: no one participate if 
they are too elderly or have a serious chronic illness…And, if one cell-
partner cannot join, then the other shouldn’t either…Anyone can join any 
time while the HS continues and should remain on it as long as possible in 
support. 
 
Pelican Bay prisoner 2 ‘recommend(s)’ that prisoners ought not become involved should 
they have extra-medical issues. That being said, while the decision to participate should 
be personal and voluntary, prisoners should join in with the group if they do not have any 
other reason not to join indefinitely. In an interview with a physician who had been a 
private correctional medical consultant, also associated with California Prison Focus, I 
was informed prisoners’ communal support in hunger strike participation: 
AM: So there was some sort of camaraderie or communal suggestions to 
one another, like, you should continue or you should not continue with the 
strike? 
Physician: There was a lot of caring for each other in there...that people 
are very sick, on multiple meds, and that yeah, [you should] support us in 
other ways, write to your friends…there’s stuff to do, but you don’t have 
to be the one putting your life in jeopardy. I mean, no one wanted to die. 
The Pelican Bay and California prisoners overall hoped that as many prisoners as 
possible would join the movement, yet participation could be manifested in other ways 
beyond simply not eating, such as writing letters, communicating information, and 
providing other forms of moral support. That being said, most letters discuss involvement 
relative to not eating.  
In another letter in this issue of Prison Focus, prisoner 1 explains how the strike 
will be defined by refusing solid food but also by taking water, i.e., the protest is not to be 
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a dry hunger strike. This letter emphasizes the three-race unity of the resistance, asking 
CPF to publish letters from prisoners from each of the three racial groups with which 
prisoners identify in order to represent this phenomenon. Thus the group orientation of 
the strikes is demonstrated by their desire for equal racial representation of their social 
organization.  
Other Short Corridor prisoners discuss the inter-racial cooperation in the hunger 
strikes leading up to the first 2011 strike. In a letter dated April 24, 2011, Pelican Bay 
(and Short Corridor) prisoner 3 comments on this phenomenon:  
...the so-called worst of the worst prisoners have gotten together and 
agreed to a peaceful protest…New Afrikans, Mexicans, Whites, and others 
have signed on to do this indefinitely until our demands [are] met…this is 
a small step but there’s no telling where we can go from here if we survive 
this Hunger Strike.  
 
Thus, according to Short Corridor prisoner 3 here, the cross-racial, group commitment for 
enduring violence by hunger striking across racial lines in the SHU prison population is 
necessary to produce change. This letter also discusses the extent of participation:  
This is a call for all prisoners in (SHU) Security Housing units, (Ad-Seg’s) 
Administration Segregation and (G.P.s) General Population as well as the 
free oppressed and non-oppressed people to support the July 1st 2011 
Peaceful Hunger Strike Protest… If you cannot participate in the ‘Hunger 
Strike’ then support it in principle by not eating the first 24 hours of the 
hunger strike.   
 
Thus while it was based in the SHU, the Short Corridor was interested in establishing 
solidarity beyond their specific space of confinement within the larger carceral apparatus 
of Pelican Bay and throughout the California system. Prisoner 3, as a Short Corridor 
representative, asks that other prisoners show solidarity by not eating for the first day. 
Additionally, this demonstrates the dichotomy present between the social expectation that 
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prisoners do what they are told versus acting on a personal conviction outside of this 
structure.   
The Short Corridor prisoners frequently spoke in their letters about wanting to be 
referred to as ‘representatives’ of the strikes, and not ‘leaders’ in order to discursively 
separate themselves from the ways in which the CDCR represented the strikes as being 
coercively organized by gang influence. This was echoed in several different letters sent 
by several different members of the Short Corridor who were representatives of the 
different racial and ethnic groups in the prison. A letter dated May 30 sent by Short 
Corridor prisoner 1 identifies the “Principal H.S. Representatives/Negotiators” of which 
there are nine including Short Corridor prisoner 1. This prisoner asks CPF to 
electronically share this information, because if other prisoners in the California system 
see it then it will impact the number of prisoners across the state that participate. In a 
June 8 letter, prisoner 2 asks CPF to add a Short Corridor prisoner to the published list of 
representatives. It is unclear why this representative did not write to explain this himself; 
however, this demonstrates that there is a defined representative authority to which other 
SHU prisoners heeded their attention.  
While the strike began July 8, prisoners did not all join the movement 
immediately. The extent of participation evolved slowly as the strike began. In a letter 
from June 12, Short Corridor prisoner 4 explains how the representative structure 
continues to recruit other prisoners to join the movement:  
Those who are healthy we are still trying to convince them to participate, 
if even for just a few days. Hopefully we can get another 1 or 2 before the 
target date. (Note: there are others from different groups who are 
participating and will raise the overall number for this unit).  
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This passage illustrates challenges in recruitment. The letter goes on to say that this 
particular prisoners’ unit has many older prisoners who cannot safely participate, as the 
strike is voluntary, not mandatory. Short Corridor prisoner 4 discusses expectations for 
striking:  
As far as the Northern Mexicans are concerned, we are only requesting a 
minimum of five days and anything beyond that will be left up to the 
individual participant. At least one of us has committed to at least 10 days. 
But we are not pushing an all or nothing agenda. In other words, we are 
not asking people to die for this, all we are asking is to do what you can.  
 
It is not entirely clear why the representatives are calling for this particular racial group to 
strike for five days, after which point the strike is up left to prisoners on their own. 
Nevertheless, while the strike is said to be voluntary, this discourse suggests that the 
Short Corridor desired for certain numbers of prisoners to participate for certain durations 
of time; however, establishing participation was evidently an initial challenge for the 
representative structure.   
In a July 7 letter, a Corcoran prisoner provides details regarding the strike 
leadership structure in place in the Corcoran SHU just before the first strike began:  
One of our spokespersons, (name redacted), has spoken to administration 
officials in relation to the hunger strike on at least three occasions. On the 
last occasion the administration expressed its desire to meet with each 
participant individually – an obvious gambit to muddle or fracture the core 
demands and how they are presented. Brother (name redacted) of course 
has rejected this, as did the other spokespersons. The collective New 
Afrikan population has made it clear that we speak with one voice, and 
only we dictate the terms of any discussion, and (name redacted) is our 
voice in any such dialogue. 
 
This passage reflects relations between the prison authorities and SHU prisoners, but 
specifically the ‘spokespersons,’ which are Corcoran’s equivalent of the ‘representatives’ 
at Pelican Bay. A certain form of social hierarchy is sketched out here, in that power is 
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vested in one of the spokespersons for purposes of communicating and negotiating with 
the prison authorities. According to this prisoner, other prisoners refused intimidation by 
the guards, in effect respecting the spokesperson(s) position of localized authority.   
Prisoners commented on the scope of prisoner participation in their letters in the 
following weeks of the hunger strike. As of July 14, spokesperson 1 at Corcoran 
describes the growing involvement of racial groups as the strike continues: 
On 7/9/11 our white brothers began entering the fray, moving from moral 
support to active participation in the hunger strike, while our Northern 
Mexican brothers continue to lend their moral support. The New Afrikan 
and Southern Mexican collectives have persevered unabated and there 
have been several more hospitalizations…  
 
While these letters reporting on recruitment state that older prisoners are not expected to 
join the strikes because of their age or other health issues, several of these prisoners were 
reported to be striking on some level despite medical implications.  
Facing dwindling participants and an ultimatum from CDCR stating that they 
would re-examine the 5 Core Demands, the Short Corridor chose to end the first hunger 
strike after three weeks. In an August 22 letter, Short Corridor prisoner 1 shares plans for 
another hunger strike in the fall: 
…as it stands now, the H.S. will begin around 2, on Sept. 26 (a lot of the 
Africans are doing Ramadan during mo. of August; plus we want to see 
what…comes of the Aug. 23rd assembly hearing. 
 
As we can see, the Short Corridor acknowledged cultural appreciation as being necessary 
for the success of a collective movement, in order for African American prisoners of the 
Muslim faith to be involved in the next strike. This passage also exhibits a certain level of 
consciousness of prisoners being a class in and of themselves, as the Short Corridor 
recognizes the challenges to group resistance and seeks to work around them.  
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An October 9 letter from Corcoran spokesperson 1 provides details of social organization 
during the second strike:  
All new afrikan and southern mexican partisans in this isolation unit…are 
participating in the hunger strike, while our white and southern mexican 
brothers are providing support. We have not eaten since September 25th 
and the administration here has unleashed an unprecedented wave of 
retaliatory reprisals aimed against us at breaking the hunger strikes and 
provoking a reaction which would undermine the non-violent basis of this 
peaceful protest. They have thus far failed…We are all participating of our 
own individual free will guided by a collective desire to end this 
systematic torture and industrial profiteering at our expense. 
 
As we can see, this spokesperson represents the SHU strikers at Corcoran as well 
participating out of personal convictions with a group interest. Thus there is temporal 
continuity in regard to the second strike functioning with the same goals and mentality of 
the first strike. Furthermore, there is socio-spatial continuity across the California prison 
landscape in that, while ‘spokespersons’ is a different word choice than ‘representatives,’ 
the Corcoran SHU demonstrates that they have a representative body similar to the Short 
Corridor Collective at Pelican Bay that seeks to follow the Short Corridor’s plans.   
 While prisoners within the Short Corridor Collective and other SHU prisoners 
demonstrate their willingness to recruit others to voluntarily join in the hunger strikes, it 
is unclear how much power the leadership structure had in orchestrating social 
organization. Ed Mead, California Prison Focus’s editor of Prison Focus, explains that 
despite the fact that the gang leaders in the Short Corridor did put the word out for other 
prisoners to follow, there were potential limitations to this organizing ability:  
You know, the gang leaders are not that powerful. They can't bring 30,000 
people to stop eating for a day...the first hunger strike they had 
6600...Maybe that's the extent of the influence they would have. The 
second hunger strike they had almost 12,000. The third one, of course, 
they more than doubled that on the first day. I think that has a lot to do 
with educating, you know, raising the consciousness of the population, 
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more so than—you know—some kind of command hierarchy—the line 
that CDCR pushes (Interview 4/13/2016).  
 
Mead suggests that each subsequent strike gained momentum from the precedent set by 
the previous strike, and that without each of the stages or episodes of resistance before 
the ultimate 2013 strike, 30,000 participants could not have been recruited to the struggle. 
But the gang leaders alone, as Mead states, do not have this kind of power despite their 
status as the Short Corridor Collective: “…even after the Agreement to End Hostilities, 
race riots are still taking place. A lot fewer, but if the gang leaders had that much 
discipline, those kinds of thing wouldn't be happening” (Interview 4/13/2016). It is 
difficult to ascertain to what extent these episodes of violence occurred after the 
Agreement to End Hostilities was issued; however, they clearly did not undo the terms of 
the agreement or CDCR’s agreement to acknowledge the prisoners’ demands.  
Aside from what stands out as data pertaining to the leadership structure(s) 
present in the California prison hunger strikes in 2011 and 2013, I have found thematic 
similarities that revolve specifically around the extent to which prisoners are committed 
to their movement. In a letter dated July 14, 2011, Corcoran spokesperson 1 explains how 
some prisoners, including elderly ones, had been hospitalized not long after beginning the 
strike but had been released from their hospitalization and had returned to hunger strike 
further. These prisoners refused additional care and continued not eating, despite the 
health impacts. A September 2 letter from the Pelican Bay representatives discussing the 
upcoming secondary hunger strike at the end of September:  
…even if CDC(R) now, at this late date, starts spitting out memos and 
even installing pull-up bars, dip bars, etc., in an attempt to undermine the 
H.S., we will “not”, call off the H.S. until all our Five (5) Core Demands 
are met, or unrefutable tangible proof that they will all be met.  
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As a result of the CDCR’s lack of response to the demands, the Short Corridor explains 
that they will be unrelenting in their resistance until such reforms are made. This emotion 
is still present several weeks later when the second strike was initiated. In a September 28 
letter, Pelican Bay prisoner 5 emphasizes commitment during the second strike:  
(I) will not eat until Friday the 30th. As I have stated before I will not eat 
until we get concrete change and justice in longterm isolation and 
validation policy. Or I will die fighting for justice…The fight continues 
and I shall stay the course until we achieve victory.  
 
This stated commitment to death and self-incurred violence was commented on in other 
letters. In particular, this necropolitical discourse was echoed from the spokesperson(s) at 
Corcoran.  A letter of July 14, 2011 from Corcoran spokesperson 1 also illustrates this 
commitment to the violent implications of the struggle: “I am, and most who think as I 
do, are comfortable with the notion of dying to ensure we effect a meaningful change in 
this torture without end.” This prisoner further states that they did not intend to cease 
resistance until:  
…the hunger strike was over and that the 5 core demands would be met. 
However, until we receive some verification from our comrades in Pelican 
Bay, we will not stop…We are all prepared to continue until our bodies 
fail… 
 
A letter dated June 23, 2013 sent by Pelican Bay representative 1 discusses plans 
for a third upcoming hunger strike at the beginning of July. Representative 1, in reference 
to himself and the rest of the collective SHU population, indicates that “We will await 
our death…”, thus representing group commitment to not giving up on the hunger strike 
until CDCR agrees to consider their 5 Core Demands. Corcoran prisoner 2, in describing 
developments after over a month of striking, writes about the extent to which the group 
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movement was withstanding the strike. This prisoner comments on prisoners who had 
terminated their strikes after being further isolated from one another: 
So they gave up everything just to be moved back to 4BII. It was an 
incredibly selfish act. All of this sacrifice – putting our minds & bodies 
through this, the 115s, the validation points, the loss of credits, TVs, 
canteens…all for naught. So you know, virtually everyone is stunned & 
upset at this decision but they can’t complain. They are mandated to 
follow orders w/out question. But no one governs the Crips, so we are still 
hunger striking…without the numbers of the masses our sacrifice is 
meaningless – or has at least has no practical effect. And that creates a 
huge dilemma for me: Do we continue or stop?  
 
In a letter from the following day, August 17, 2013, Corcoran prisoner 2 explains how 
social expectations for hunger strike participation had been loosened by this stage in the 
strike: 
The leaders of the other groups have modified their positions and now say 
that participation in the H/S is optional. This is widely seen as an attempt 
to somehow cover up what they must now painfully & regrettably 
recognize was a terrible decision. But regardless, making it optional is still 
abandoning everyone. For though it has always technically been optional, 
every able-bodied person was strongly encouraged to participate – sort of 
like an opt-out policy. But now it’s the exact opposite – more like an opt-
in policy. And the early returns remain discouraging as less than 10% of 
the former strikers in my building have elected to opt in. I expect that 
those of us who remain will be moved and isolated in an attempt to break 
us. So, in sum, the Crips here remain on H/S, the overall numbers here are 
expected to be low (but committed).  
 
Thus we can see the extent to which collective gang organization was in effect during the 
final days of the hunger strike at Corcoran. According to this prisoners’ account of 
events, multiple prisoners had broken the strike after having been relocated as a form of 
discipline for resisting. Interestingly, this prisoner explains how the Crips make their own 
decisions regarding continuous striking outside of cross-racial initiatives. This ‘opt-in’ 
decision for choosing to further strike or no longer strike reflects the greater freedom that 
was extended to prisoners, in that participation in the resistance was more individualized 
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by this point at Corcoran, despite what was occurring at Pelican Bay and any directives 
that were still coming from the Short Corridor Collective. 
 It is also notable that along with the 2013 hunger strike there was a joint work 
stoppage in general populations across the California system. The CDCR reported that 
2600 prisoners had engaged in a labor strike in solidarity with the hunger strike. Further 
details regarding the extent of involvement at Pelican Bay in particular and breakdowns 
of labor strikers at other California prisons is not known, as CDCR has no obligation to 
report this data to the public. Like the hunger strikes, this was planned far in advance. A 
proposal for a joint work stoppage was discussed in a letter sent to CPF dated October 15, 
2012: 
 I concur with one of the strategies, laid out by (name redacted). His 
suggestion for economic disruption would be the proper addition to our 
other tactic, of hunger striking. If we partake in both of these actions cdcr 
would most definitely take a more serious interest in correcting its 
malfeasance acts…We must engage in attacking the cdcr’s economic 
programs (i.e., PIA work program, and its outside business resources, like 
businesses that redistribute its products. This strategy will be seen as 
effective in other progressive movements. However, our progressive 
comrades from the outside must take part…Sacrifice inside must be 
unified and unrelenting.  
 
According to the editor of Prison Focus, work stoppages in prison are rather rare and 
involve a significant amount of vulnerability, as jobs in prison are difficult to obtain, in 
addition to the fact that prisoners receive extremely low pay for their work. Mead also 
reported that while the 2013 hunger strike had a length of two months, the work stoppage 
only lasted for several days. According to Mead, the work stoppages’ limited scope is not 
necessarily surprising: "…while the number of participants [in the California hunger 
strikes] was of historical significance, it was a mile wide but only an inch deep, in order 
to bring about what needs to come about…Just as that 30,000 figure started rapidly 
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declining, the following day, so too did the number of people participating in work 
strikes...Everyone is on board until it starts getting tough”. Thus despite the extent of the 
movement going beyond the SHU, the labor strike was merely a display of solidarity for 
the SHU, and did not go further with its own set of interests. It is unclear whether there 
were work stoppage representatives in the general populations, or if gangs simply 
accepted the idea as directed by the Short Corridor representatives at Pelican Bay. 
Outcomes of the Pelican Bay & CA Prison Hunger Strikes 
The state of California reached a settlement with the plaintiffs in the class action suit, 
Ashker vs. Governor of California, as of September 1, 2015. The settlement calls for a 
number of reforms to the California prison system. As of the settlement date, California 
will no longer impose indefinite SHU sentences. Alternately, the CDCR is working on 
establishing a two-year, four-step, step-down program for prisoners to be able to return to 
the general population, with prisoners receiving increased privileges at each step. 
Furthermore, California will review all current gang-validated SHU prisoners within one 
year of the settlement in order to determine if prisoners should be released from the SHU 
under settlement terms. Additionally, the CDCR will create a modified general 
population, titled ‘Restrictive General Population Unit,’ or RCGP, for rule violators who 
have recently committed a serious offense. While this space will be a high-isolation 
environment, its goal is to extend freedoms from the general population as a more human 
alternative to the SHU itself, where prisoners can move freely, have out-of-cell time and 
can receive visits (Center for Constitutional Rights 2016).  
 Since September 2015, the CDCR has reviewed 1,126 prisoners in solitary 
confinement and has approved 929 to leave solitary. 781 prisoners have already been 
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transferred to the general population (Center for Constitutional Rights 2016). Members of 
Pelican Bay’s Short Corridor met with CDCR officials on April 16, 2016 as the 
beginning of the prisoners’ involvement in the new monitoring process. Prisoner 
participation in the monitoring process is another outcome of the settlement and will 
continue to be a common practice in the implementation of the settlement’s reforms 
(Center for Constitutional Rights 2016).  
While the settlement has delivered and will continue to deliver these shifts in 
penal policy in California, Prison Focus editor Ed Mead argues that agreeing to the 
settlement was not the best decision for the SHU population:  
I have a strong disagreement with the settlement. I think if the case had 
gone to trial the public education and consciousness raising would have 
been incredible. But being gang leaders, and only able to see as far as they 
can throw, they opted to get out, rather than wait a while and do it right. 
So that's what they did, they got themselves out. They've been out for a 
while, and there's nothing…The silence coming out of California prisons 
is deafening… of course, the problem is, the old worst of the worst are 
released, and there come a new worst of the worst. So, you know, the SHU 
remains full. They haven't dealt with the issue. They haven't... As far as 
I'm concerned…the (settlement) was a sell out.   
 
In hindsight we can only speculate on this; however, while it is possible that greater 
publicity may have been the result of the case actually going to trial, the Short Corridor’s 
social organization, along with legal counsel at the Center for Constitutional Rights, was 
able to see their demands affect meaningful change in policy.  
Patterns of the Social Organization in the Pelican Bay/CA Hunger Strikes 
 
 Reiter (2014) relates the California hunger strikes to Black Panther George 
Jackson and the broader social justice movement at San Quentin in the early 1970s; 
Reiter suggests that the strikes invoked human rights discourse of an international 
dimension, which echoed “the international anti-imperialism dialogue Jackson invoked to 
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defend and legitimize his claims” (2014). It is evident that the Short Corridor prisoners 
illustrate a certain level of class-consciousness in the planning and social conduct of their 
strikes; however, I have examined additional letters that argue that the hunger strikes 
should not be represented as having a historical connection with any other movement in 
terms of goals or demands, suggesting that Reiter’s claim is not entirely accurate. Reiter 
(2013) as well as Earle (2015) describe one of the representatives in the Short Corridor, 
Todd Ashker, as a “leader” which is an inappropriate representation; the ethnographic 
prisoner discourse in this case study demonstrates that prisoners sought to discursively 
deny any alleged coercive power structure or hierarchy for fear of gang representatives 
being labeled by the prison authorities as leaders, in an attempt to deny the legitimacy of 
the strikes. Thus it follows that we should not uncritically adhere to the CDCR’s carceral 
imagination of Short Corridor prisoners inducing gang-based coercion by organizing the 
hunger strikes. 
 Additionally, Reiter (2013) argues that the Pelican Bay hunger strikes lacked a 
shared political ideology in their collective resistance when compared to other hunger 
strikes. Reiter cites the 1981 IRA strikes, hunger strikes by Palestinian prisoners and even 
the GTMO hunger strikes as examples in which prisoners exhibited a shared political 
philosophy. This statement is also not entirely accurate; in regard to GTMO, my data in 
chapter 3 shows that decisions to hunger strike are quite varied, and that there are many 
individual interests at work, not to mention that strikes are sporadic, even if they manifest 
in the form of a group movement. Within the social organization of their resistance, my 
data reveals that the Short Corridor representatives at Pelican Bay as well as the other 
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SHU spokespersons at Corcoran performed a political ideology that revolved around 
fighting back against state violence and policy in order to end indefinite SHU detention.  
While this is evident, the extent to which other non-representatives in the SHU 
truly believed in and understood the strikes’ political context is unclear. Ed Mead 
suggests that “The majority of prisoners don't have class consciousness… Their only 
information is what they get from bourgeois television and newspapers. They're not going 
to develop class consciousness”. More direct ethnographic accounts that reveal any wider 
class-consciousness of the SHU population in Pelican Bay or throughout the greater 
California system beyond the hunger strike representatives have yet to be collected. 
Nevertheless, the ethnographic discourse presented here demonstrates that this effort was 
driven by a small group of prisoners that exhibit a level of social, political and cultural 
awareness that was necessary for being able to socially organize the SHU population at 
Pelican Bay and across the California prison landscape. Compliance amongst racial 
groups was a prerequisite for this organization, and a ‘representative’ or ‘spokesperson’ – 
based power structure was the most discursively non-hierarchical basis for executing this, 
as non – Short Corridor prisoners wrote in their letters showing agreement with the Short 
Corridor’s plans. Collective prisoner identity carried significant weight as opposed to 
singular racial identities in these geographies of resistance.  
 In this chapter I have explained the historical foundation of solitary confinement 
in California, its context with the 2011 and 2013 hunger strikes, as well as what power 
relations were present in how SHU prisoners were able to socially coordinate their 
hunger strike resistance movements. In chapter 5 I share my conclusions on both the 
GTMO and California hunger strikes, and explore my third research question in greater 
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depth, bringing together the empirical studies of resistance in these two carceral spaces 
with the biopolitical context of these hunger strikes. I will discuss the relationships 
between power, identity and violence relative to GTMO and Pelican Bay, and will also 
discuss the biopolitical geographies of resistance from micro-scale, localized perspective, 
in which oppressed populations manage their bodies and the violence endured as a 
manifestation of subaltern power.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
Power, Scale & Resistance 
Power means control. In asserting its authority, power strives to maintain, 
establish and further its goals and objectives in space. In simpler terms, space is a key 
vehicle through which power is practiced. To discuss power without simultaneously 
discussing the role space plays in power’s functioning would preclude us from fully 
acknowledging power’s complexities. In short, power and space are codependent actors, 
and neither can operate independent of one another. 
 The geographical imagination of power relies upon modes of thought that are 
often ideological or discursive. As any Foucauldian scholar will argue, power is 
everywhere. As Foucault would say, power operates in particular forms and should be 
categorized as such, i.e. as technologies, techniques, mechanisms or apparatuses of 
power. Discourse and ideology are techniques of power that reflect and/or contribute to 
representational power and its interests; however, linguistic functionalism aside, it is also 
pertinent to imagine geographies of power through a material dimension that analyses of 
representation do not immediately acknowledge. In other words, while speech acts are 
techniques of power (i.e., categorical and generalizable statements constructed and posed 
as truth), power can operate beyond this discursive realm. Power can be physically and 
materially performed in space, such as through forms of embodied resistance, e.g., 
hunger striking.  
My first two research questions are aimed at providing insight into the initial 
objective and subjective context for understanding the internal power relations and social 
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organization of hunger striking in two prison environments. I have sought to establish the 
‘how’ relative to hunger strike social organization, in addition to the ‘why’ prisoners 
resist with the power relations and social organization that they do. I have done this by 
second-hand data through interviews in both case studies as well as through direct 
prisoner ethnographies in the case of the California strikes. Following the presentation of 
my data in each empirical chapter, I summarized the social patterns and trends in the 
social organization of hunger striking in both spaces of confinement. It is these patterns 
that I conceptually contextualize here in the conclusion.  
My research questions are intentionally hierarchical in nature, as each builds upon 
one another in order to understand my third research question on the interrelationships 
between and among power, identity and violence. This question emphasizes a very 
localized, micro scale perspective on social relations in hunger striking resistance. As 
geographers we certainly must consider how power is developed and exercised by those 
who sit at the upper tiers of power structures; however, we also must consider the 
materialities of power – which are often subsequently linked to violence – that are 
performed and authenticated by the agency of individuals and groups whose social 
realities are defined by domination and oppression. Therefore answering this third 
research question requires us to go beyond simply identifying techniques of power that 
are orchestrated by the state. In these cases we are interested in the performance of 
hunger strike resistance and prisoner agency thereof.  
Thus a theory of the biopolitical geographies of resistance is necessary in order to 
contextualize the complexities of power, identity and violence in space. While GTMO 
and Pelican Bay are the empirical case studies examined in this thesis, this perspective is 
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applicable within the socio-spatial dynamics of hunger striking within and beyond the 
prison landscape.  
Foucault’s Biopolitics vs. The Biopolitical Geographies of Resistance 
 
The state produces embodied vulnerability and violence that bodies must endure. 
The state “invest(s) in life”, as Foucault would say, in order to conduct biopower, i.e., 
establishing the prison at GTMO, and by creating the infrastructure for solitary 
confinement in California. As the state needs bodies to do what the state wants to do, it 
will manage and regulate populations for its interests. At both GTMO and Pelican Bay, 
the themes of representation and exceptionality are evident. GTMO prisoners must be 
detained in a space in order to be represented as terrorists to justify the U.S.’s geopolitical 
actions in the Middle East. The CDCR ambiguously imprisons labeled gang affiliates in 
solitary confinement, which are exceptional spaces, in order to construct the spectacle 
that such prisoners are the ‘worst of the worst’, in the CDCR’s own words, and therefore 
deserve to have their identities stripped of them and be indefinitely incarcerated – a 
mechanism that creates greater violence than it is expected to limit; however, biopolitics 
functions at more micro scales as incarcerated subaltern populations to seek to manage 
themselves through embodied resistance.  
From a Foucauldian biopolitical perspective, there is unquestionably a relation 
between prisoners and the state, in which the state regulates and manages the wider social 
body of these prison populations. In order to regulate these prison populations, a certain 
level of anatamo-politics and discipline is necessary within the hierarchies of the state. It 
is a panoptical expectation that hierarchically placed bodies that carry out state power and 
perpetrate state violence do just that, yet political and/or ideological uniformity within the 
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panopticon is net necessarily a given. In simpler terms, the hierarchies that execute state 
sovereignty may have differing interests or desire as members of the state. While these 
realities should be understood, violence still is the outcome of many techniques of state 
power that result in subaltern performance of resistance. It is this localized, micro-scale 
framework of resistance that is the focus of my analysis.  
While my research illustrates that there are a mix of individual interests present in 
hunger strike resistance at GTMO, long-term incarceration and cultural disrespect are 
common justifications for protest. This social body must be detained to represent alleged 
success in the state’s fight against terrorism. These prisoners are not trained or disciplined 
as subjects in an anatomo-political format, as Foucault would define it, but are rather 
bodies that are managed to represent U.S. power and domination. At Pelican Bay and 
throughout the California prison system, solitary confinement functions as prisons within 
prisons, for prisoners to be indefinitely detained outside of the legal bounds of the court 
system. The CDCR represents prisoners as ‘the worst of the worst’, who therefore are 
imagined to be deserving of solitary confinement. The CDCR argues that gang 
organization produces violence, which can only be eradicated by indefinite solitary 
detention. Thus constructing representations of prison populations is a technique of state 
power. It is evident that representation, and the material realities of indefinite 
imprisonment, have produced geographies of resistance.  
Life and death become confusing constructs within the GTMO and California 
prison landscapes. At GTMO, prisoners are detained indefinitely as an outcome of their 
ambiguous legal status, and are further not prohibited from dying by hunger striking 
because they are ultimately force-fed. Within the SHUs in California, prisoners may be 
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released at the end of their sentence; this is unlikely to happen, however. Instead they are 
usually stuck between a rock and hard place because ratting out other prisoners is not an 
option prisoners frequently choose. The relationship between hunger striking and the 
state exists where hunger striking is agency over the possibility of further bare life that 
seeks to put the legitimacy of state power in question. That being said, such a critique of 
state policy and power may or may not strive to produce structural change, as the 
resistance may be more of an illustration of identity.  
The 2005 GTMO strike saw the prisoners define their demands, yet in 2013 the 
main goal of the strike was rather uncertain and was not significantly articulated by the 
prisoners. At Pelican Bay and throughout California in 2011 and 2013 the prisoners very 
directly and overtly expressed their Five Core Demands, and the hunger strike 
movements attempted to change and were somewhat successful in the 2015 settlement 
altering SHU policies in California. At GTMO, hunger striking is more difficult because 
of the immanent threat of force-feeding by the state. Having tubes inserted through a 
prisoner’s nose into their esophagus and having them removed three times a day is an 
extremely debilitating, painful and overall violent process. Thus the state biopolitically 
regulates prisoners’ vital biological processes by not permitting prisoners to die, limiting 
the agency of prisoners, and further tortures prisoners by force-feeding them. At Pelican 
Bay the final strike ended before an order to force-feed prisoners was issued, so we 
cannot know to what extent prisoners would have endured being force-fed, and ultimately 
how difficult it would have been for them to reach death. As we can see, hunger strikes 
bridge micro and macro-structural processes, and thus the relations and negotiations 
between prisoners and the state should not be denied or go unrecognized; however, the 
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presence of power structures in the conduct of the social organization of resistance 
functions on a more localized scale within prison populations themselves. It is the choice 
of greater self-reduction to more violent forms of bare life that is the crux of this 
localized power. 
While such resistance may be a rejection of bare life as imposed by the state, the 
act of protesting by depriving one’s body of nutrients for sustained periods of time is a 
form of socially manufactured bare life on a subaltern scale. This is not a manifestation of 
coercive self-harm where prisoners should be represented as suffering from hunger 
striking because it is their ‘own fault’, as the DOD and CDCR have represented hunger 
strikers; rather, it is a tactic in which prisoners reduce themselves to a greater level of 
bare life by actively harming themselves beyond the violence and abuse already being 
endured. Thus the biopolitical geographies of resistance inform us as to the extent to 
which individuals and groups seek to manage and regulate their own vital biological 
processes in carceral space. 
Between GTMO and Pelican Bay, there is social differentiation with regard to the 
scale of the body, i.e., the social patterns within both carceral spaces are somewhat 
dissimilar in prisoners’ commitment to enduring violence by hunger striking. In 
comparing and contrasting the social organization of hunger striking at GTMO and 
Pelican Bay/California writ large, hunger strike resistance at GTMO appears to be a less 
committed struggle than the strikes within the California prison system. Prisoners’ letters 
from Pelican Bay and Corcoran illustrate that they were extremely committed to the 
strike, willing to protest to the death if necessary. While the letters exhibiting class-
consciousness came largely from the representatives and spokespersons, non-
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representatives also wrote saying they would choose to protest to the death if the 
movement required it. Gang identity brought together members of the same race and 
different races, even if the non-representatives did not necessarily understand the wider 
structural aspects of the struggle. Such prisoners were willing to reduce themselves to 
bare life by not eating as a statement of solidarity, as hunger striking for even a brief 
period of time was a performance illustrating linkages between individuals, the wider 
racial group and the collective of racial groups working together. It was, however, the 
representatives and spokespersons that had stayed the course by the end of the 2013 
strike, as only about 40 prisoners at Pelican Bay were still striking when the protest was 
called off. Thus for a California prisoner in solitary confinement to perform his identity 
for himself and his peers, he must assume the personal responsibility of the possibility of 
death by hunger striking.  
These comparisons and contrasts in the social patterns of hunger strike power 
relations and social organization in both of these prisons illustrate the overlapping aspects 
of anatomo-politics and biopolitics. At GTMO, prisoners demonstrate their docility to the 
imams in the Prisoners’ Council only to a point; if the imams call for a strike, the 
prisoners are expected to join a movement for at least a brief period of time. And while 
prisoners docile to the Council in communicating about the possibility of striking 
individually through more personalized geographies of performed resistance, prisoners 
can exercise this level of autonomy and freedom unto themselves. When a movement 
occurs at GTMO, the imams need prisoners to initially participate, i.e., the Prisoners’ 
Council biopolitically seeks to harness the vital biological processes of the rest of the 
prison population’s bodies in order to perform the Muslim identity that the Council 
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wishes to perform. In California, the Agreement to End Hostilities was a call by gang 
leaders to end inter-gang animosities and violent encounters in order to encourage the 
peaceful power of the hunger strikes. This was a disciplinary technique of power that 
sought to produce individuated compliance across racial groups in California SHUs. 
From the perspective of the Short Corridor Collective, this anatomo-political framework 
was necessary pragmatically in order to mobilize the wider SHU population at Pelican 
Bay and throughout the California system in collective resistance. Furthermore, as Ed 
Mead explains, the majority of SHU prisoners do not possess significant class 
consciousness or awareness of the structural inequalities being resisted by hunger 
striking, and thus by hunger striking that majority of prisoners became docile bodies. In 
simpler terms, the Short Corridor required mass-scale resistance by mobilizing SHU 
prisoners to manipulate their vital biological processes. And while the average SHU 
prisoners were not docile to the state by resisting state power and state violence by 
hunger striking, the average SHU prisoners lacking class-consciousness were partly 
docile to the Short Corridor by participating in the movements.  
As I have illustrated with my data, GTMO is a case where Muslim identity plays a 
role in strike operationalization. The imams in the Prisoners’ Council can call for group 
strikes, and able-bodied prisoners are expected to join, in part because of the imams’ 
status. Should prisoners want to protest on their own, they must share their plans with the 
imams because the imams are the religious leaders, who then advise prisoners on 
individualized strikes. Yet despite these socio-organizational elements GTMO prisoners 
appear to exhibit less commitment to resisting than California hunger strikers. 
Interestingly, the data showing strike participation in the 2013 movement which includes 
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the number of strikers being hospitalized and tube fed over time (as shown in figure 1 in 
chapter 3) tells us that even though the number of strikers rose to 106 participants from 
the beginning of April to the beginning of July, less than half of the participants were 
force-fed between the beginning of May and the beginning of July, and this number 
declined as the number of strikers began to decline in July. Prisoners are officially 
considered hunger strikers after missing nine meals at GTMO, but they are not force-fed 
until they drop below a particular percentage of their initial body weight. The state 
clearly mitigates hunger strikers by violent force-feeding, as I have stated above; 
however, a core group of 10-20 prisoners continued not eating and endured force-feeding 
well into October. This group very likely included the Prisoners’ Council, as well as a 
selection of a few other committed prisoners. Thus despite a peak in the number of 
strikers, most prisoners did not strike for prolonged durations of time, as the Prisoners’ 
Council assumed this authority. It is the Council that takes on the responsibility of 
enduring violence, as more of a representation of symbolic power and performance of 
identity than a radical movement. This non-binding power structure effectively limits the 
scale of participation, consequently also limiting the scale of the body and endurance of 
violence by most prisoners.  
To put this together, the scale of the body and the biopolitical geographies of 
resistance are unique to each respective prison space, with different factors catalyzing or 
inhibiting the social organization and endurance of violence in hunger strike protest. 
While hunger strikers are affected by force-feedings at GTMO, there are fewer criteria 
for hunger striking than in the 2011 and 2013 California strikes. Fewer prisoners 
participating in the hunger strikes at GTMO, and consequently the fewer prisoners 
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enduring the violence of refusing food, is an outcome of cultural norms and roles 
performed and not performed in carceral space. Greater unification was present in 
California prisons, which contributed to prisoners’ willingness to end up death fasting if 
the CDCR had not capitulated to their demands. Racial and gang identities were present 
in the organization of the California strikes; however the Short Corridor Collective was 
able to further produce an identity of prisoner class-consciousness across racial lines to 
the extent that it encouraged and established a scale of strike participation that went 
beyond the Short Corridor, regardless of whether SHU prisoners fully appreciated the 
greater political context and implications of the strikes.  
The Biopolitical Geographies of Resistance: Beyond the Hunger Strike 
The relationships between power, identity and violence in carceral space constitute 
the biopolitical geographies of resistance. The biopolitical geographies of resistance are 
embodied vulnerabilities that the subaltern construct for themselves, in which subaltern 
populations access agency and power by subjecting themselves to violence through the 
availability of their physical bodies. These geographies of violence depend and draw 
upon various genres of identity and power relations in order to operationalize the hunger 
strike as a biopolitical geography of resistance. Subjecting oneself to violence is a 
technique of power that becomes necessary in order to perform identity and/or to critique 
or resist state power and state violence. While these geographies are present within 
hunger striking in carceral space, such geographies can extend to other tactics of 
resistance within and outside of the prison landscape. 
As the research shows, a labor strike was planned and occurred in the California 
prison system along with the third hunger strike in 2013. These events were only 
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marginally mentioned in the data I had available to me, as letters did not provide any 
greater detail beyond what I presented in the latter portion of chapter 4. Work stoppages, 
while they do not as overtly affect prisoners’ vital biological processes in the same 
capacity as a hunger strike, are biopolitical nonetheless because they put prisoners’ vital 
biological processes in jeopardy at certain scales; prisoners are fortunate to have jobs at 
all, and often depend on the meager income to support themselves in ways that the prison 
does not. Additionally, prison labor frequently functions as a system of social 
reproduction in order for the institution itself to function; work stoppages therefore are an 
even more powerful mechanism of protest because prisoners’ vital biological processes 
become threatened when that very system of social reproduction is brought to a halt. 
Furthermore, there are economic linkages and contractual obligations that extend outside 
of carceral space, in which a labor strike has implications for the vital biological 
processes of non-prisoners. Thus labor strikes in prison are another apparatus that falls 
into the category of the biopolitical geographies of resistance.  
Furthermore, gender is an additional unit of analysis that must be examined. The 
GTMO and California prisoners are an all-male population, and the ways in which gender 
is a form of identity that affects hunger strike social organization and power relations has 
yet to be investigated. Additionally, geographers have not examined the gendered 
elements of hunger strike resistance in general, within and outside of carceral space. How 
does gender performativity function within the power structures and social organization 
of hunger striking? These questions and examples of social relations that produce these 
technologies of protest have not been deeply investigated, nor have these formations of 
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resistance been evaluated within this biopolitical framework. These are possible 
directions for future research.  
Thus biopolitical geographies of resistance exist within socio-spatial circumstances 
where we see subaltern management of the subaltern’s physical, material body’s vital 
biological processes. The subaltern within carceral space harnesses the body through 
violent means in order to perform identities, and/or to critique or alter state violence. The 
scope of the biopolitical geographies of resistance, however, extends beyond spaces of 
incarceration, and its theoretical potential should not be limited solely to these tactics 
within these spaces. This framework is applicable in studies of other social movements 
and spaces where protesters take advantage of the body, enduring violence in order to 
exercise power. We must acknowledge that resistant power is multifaceted in its 
techniques of operationalization, and that violence within peaceful biopolitical resistance 
may be an inevitable and even necessary component of such protest. The state 
manufactures violent social realities that provoke geographies of resistance; however, it is 
the discourse of bare life that must be produced by those bodies that are oppressed. In 
other words, the structures of state violence may only be put in jeopardy by the subaltern 
choosing to subject itself to greater violence.  
In sum, utilizing the body as the bearer and vehicle of power relations is a measure of 
protest that is intentionally conducted to produce discourse revealing the subaltern’s 
social realities and lived experiences, despite the extent to which prisoners are organized 
for social change or not. Such starvation politics and the labor of dying constitute 
geographies of the extreme, in which the body is the limit and the extent of resistance. 
Subaltern populations actively engineer the slow decomposition of the body in hopes of 
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drawing attention to their exploitation. As Scanlan et al illustrate, the majority of hunger 
strikes in the last hundred years have transpired in prisons (2008). From an activist 
perspective, I argue that such a tactic of biopolitical resistance may perhaps be one of the 
most realistic options for social change in our world today, within and outside of carceral 
space. How can this be accomplished? The power generated from hunger striking can 
become discursively significant if a strike is compelling. What, then, makes a hunger 
strike compelling? There must be a significant and committed scale of involvement, in 
which a strike lasts for a sustained length of time. And while a core group of individuals 
may initially organize a strike, hierarchy must not superimpose upon members of a given 
population from resisting with their own bodies out of their own personal, intellectual 
volition. Thus all participants must possess and demonstrate class-consciousness and/or 
awareness of the structural inequalities being resisted.  
As I have emphasized above, understanding the role of the body in how state power 
functions is germane to resisting and restructuring state power in order to end state 
violence. Individualistic biopolitical geographies of resistance cannot produce the same 
discourse as a collective movement. This is particularly evident within the prison 
landscape in comparing GTMO to Pelican Bay. Thus awareness of scale relative to this 
genre of protest is necessary for any potential positive outcome. I am not attempting here 
to provide a pure prescription for how hunger strikes can or must be conducted; rather, 
based on the case studies evaluated in this thesis, I have found that, pragmatically 
speaking, these are the socio-organizational dynamics of hunger striking that better 
enable a positive outcome for strikers. Even making a statement such as this is walking 
on treacherous ground. While I am not at all telling subjugated prison populations or 
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other social movements to organize around hunger striking, the political left must present 
and accept hunger striking as a possible technology of resistance. The discursive power 
that can be generated from effectively socially organized hunger striking holds significant 
potential for social change in our world today. These possibilities cannot be ignored.  
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